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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
METHODS FOR MODELING AND ANALYZING CONCURRENT SOFTWARE
by
Reng Zeng
Florida International University, 2013
Miami, Florida
Professor Xudong He, Major Professor

Concurrent software executes multiple threads or processes to achieve high performance. However, concurrency results in a huge number of dierent system behaviors
that are dicult to test and verify. The aim of this dissertation is to develop new
methods and tools for modeling and analyzing concurrent software systems at design and code levels. This dissertation consists of several related results. First, a
formal model of Mondex, an electronic purse system, is built using Petri nets from
user requirements, which is formally veried using model checking. Second, Petri
nets models are automatically mined from the event traces generated from scientic
workows. Third, partial order models are automatically extracted from some instrumented concurrent program execution, and potential atomicity violation bugs
are automatically veried based on the partial order models using model checking.
Our formal specication and verication of Mondex have contributed to the
world wide eort in developing a veried software repository. Our method to mine
Petri net models automatically from provenance oers a new approach to build
scientic workows.

Our dynamic prediction tool, named McPatom, can predict

several known bugs in real world systems including one that evades several other
existing tools. McPatom is ecient and scalable as it takes advantage of the nature
of atomicity violations and considers only a pair of threads and accesses to a single
shared variable at one time. However, predictive tools need to consider the tradeos

vi

between precision and coverage. Based on McPatom, this dissertation presents two
methods for improving the coverage and precision of atomicity violation predictions:
1) a post-prediction analysis method to increase coverage while ensuring precision;
2) a follow-up replaying method to further increase coverage.
implemented in a completely automatic tool.
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Both methods are
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION
Concurrent software execute multiple threads or processes to achieve high performance. However, concurrency results in a huge number of dierent system behaviors
that are dicult to test and verify. The aim of this dissertation is to develop new
methods and tools for modeling and analyzing concurrent software systems at design and code levels. Figure 1.1 gives an overview of the work in this dissertation,
from the perspective of design level and code level, as well as forward engineering
and reverse engineering. This dissertation rstly focuses on the design level, makes
a shift from forward engineering to reverse engineering, then focuses on atomicity
violation bugs where reverse engineering is very useful for analysis.

Figure 1.1:

Overview of this dissertation (Contributions in this dissertation are

highlighted in green background)

1

1.1 Motivation
In recent years, both the Computing Research Association in the U.S. and the UK
Computing Research Committee proposed a set of grand challenges in computing
sciences. These grand challenges involve great technical diculties and have tremendous signicance. One common grand challenge proposed by the above organizations
is on developing dependable software systems [1]. One of the research themes of this
grand challenge is to develop a veried software repository [2]. The Mondex smart
card, an electronic purse, was chosen as the rst pilot project in 2006.

The ob-

jectives were to demonstrate how research groups can collaborate and compete in
scientic experiments, and to generate artifacts to populate the veried software
repository [3]. This dissertation contributes to the world wide eort in developing
a veried software repository by: developing a formal model of Mondex using Petri
nets and temporal logic, then applying model checking techniques to analyze the
formal model. On the other hand, formal models are often missing or incomplete,
therefore this dissertation develops methods to build formal models automatically
for scientic workows. In many disciplines, individual workows are large, due to
the large quantities of data used, so it is often very hard to create and maintain
scientic workows.
Scientic computing has entered a new era of large scaled sharing provided by the
cyberinfrastructure. Scientic workows have recently emerged as a new paradigm
for declarative representation of scientic applications as complex compositions of
software components and the dataow among them [4].

Recent eorts from the

scientic workow community aiming at large-scale capturing of provenance present
a new opportunity for using provenance to provide recommendation during creating
or updating scientic workows. Provenance, in the scientic workow community,
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refers to the sources of information, including entities and processes, involved in
producing or delivering an artifact. Provenance is important for scientists to assess
data quality, validate results, and reproduce experiments. Consequently provenance
capture becomes an important scientic workow research area. Many existing scientic workow management systems, such as Taverna [5], Kepler [6], VisTrails
[7] and Pegasus [8], capture provenance information implicitly in an event log that
records events related to the start and end of particular steps in the workow execution and the corresponding data read and write events. Based on provenance of
a combination of system-level monitoring and workow-based systems, this dissertation aims at providing a general method to mine workows from provenance to
aid designing scientic workows. Besides mining models from traces to aid model
building, this dissertation goes a step further to analyze models built on traces.
An interesting concurrent software to explore the methods of building models then
analyzing models automatically is multi-threaded programs.
Multi-threaded programs are the most dicult ones to develop and verify because
of the huge interleaving space.

Multi-core hardware is a growing industry trend,

for both high performance servers and low power mobile devices.

Multi-threaded

programs can exploit multi-core processors at their full potential. Therefore, multithreaded programs are desired to improve performance. And in the real world, most
servers and high-end critical software are multi-threaded.

Unfortunately, multi-

threaded programs are prone to bugs due to the inherent complexity caused by
concurrency. It is dicult to detect concurrency bugs due to the huge number of
possible interleavings.

Many concurrency bugs escape from testing into software

releases and cause some of the most serious computer-related accidents in history,
including a blackout leaving tens of millions of people without electricity [9]. Among
dierent types of concurrency bugs, atomicity violation bugs are the most common
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one. Atomicity violation bugs are caused by violations to the atomicity of certain
code regions without proper synchronization. They widely exist in the real world
systems and contributed to about 70% of the examined non-deadlock concurrency
bugs [10]. Therefore, techniques for detecting atomicity violation bugs are extremely
important. Toward dependable software systems, this dissertation proposes methods
to analyze multi-threaded programs at the code level using model checking to nd
atomicity violation bugs.

1.2 Model Checking
Testing is an essential part of each software development process, but cannot ensure
every possible scenario is covered. In concurrent systems, it is even more dicult
to test every possible scenario due to non-determinism, making concurrency bugs
the most troublesome in all types of software bugs. Nowadays, it is becoming more
and more important to address concurrency bugs with the prevalence of multi-core
hardware and concurrent programs.

As concurrency bugs are non-deterministic,

only exposed on specic thread or process scheduling, they are hard to trigger. This
frustrates both testing and reproduction for bug diagnosis.
Model checking is an automatic and ecient method for analyzing nite state
systems, to verify whether a given model satises given properties, by exhaustive exploration of non-determinism. To use model checking, one has to formulate both the
model and desired properties of a system into some precise mathematical language,
that is a formal specication. For example, Petri nets or

Promela can be used to

model a system while temporal logic can be used to specify the properties desired.
The analysis work in this dissertation is based on model checking techniques.
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1.3 Contributions
This dissertation addresses the following work, as highlighted in green in Figure 1.1.
All work attempts to improve software reliability using model checking techniques,
while the initial work is based on building models manually and the following-up
work aim at building models automatically, respectively, in the area of scientic
workows and atomicity violation bugs.

Model checking Petri nets at the design level

This dissertation presents a

unique solution to the grand challenge Mondex, by specifying Mondex with high level
Petri nets and temporal logic, and oering a new systematic method to translate high
level Petri net to

Promela.

Our formal specication and verication of Mondex

have contributed to the world wide eort in developing a veried software repository.
This work is based on models built manually.

Automatically building Petri net models from provenance

Aiming at build-

ing models in Petri nets automatically, this part of the dissertation presents a method
based on provenance to mine models for scientic workows, including data and control dependency. The mining result can either suggest part of other workows for
consideration, or make familiar parts of workow easily accessible, thus providing
recommendation support for scientic workow composition. This oers a new approach to build workows in the context of scientic workows.

Given the fact

that provenance captured in any scientic workow based systems or system level
monitoring systems contains information about tasks and their temporal order, the
proposed algorithm can give both control and data dependency for recommendation
during scientic workows composition. The method provided in this dissertation
can be applied to any scientic workow management systems.

5

Automatically building models from traces of program execution

Our

method checking formal models in Petri nets requires translation from Petri nets to
Promela code, this part of the dissertation considering building models in Promela
code directly in the context of atomicity violation bugs.

I present a method to

extract a thread model from an instrumented interleaved trace that only records
events related to atomicity violations.

Such an interleaved trace is much smaller

than the program behavior in a complete execution.

Furthermore the extracted

thread model enables the checking of all alternative traces with the same causal
relationships as the interleaved trace. The completeness of instrumented interleaved
traces and the extracted thread models is proved.

Model checking atomicity violation at code level

This dissertation presents

a complete set of the patterns of unserializable interleavings involving two threads
(most concurrency bugs involve only two threads [11]) containing any number of
accesses to a shared variable (either user dened or every word sized dynamically
allocated memory accessed by multiple threads).
cover the three accesses proposed in [10][12].

These patterns generalize and

These atomicity violation patterns

become property specications to be checked. Based on the extracted model and
the property specications, this dissertation oers a unique prediction tool - McPatom, for detecting atomicity violation bugs through model checking. McPatom
instruments interleaved executions, extracts thread models from interleaved traces,
automatically converts (1) thread models into Promela programs and (2) atomicity
violation patterns into property specications. By constraining the checking within
a pair of threads involving one shared variable at a time, the interleaving space to
be checked is vastly reduced. As a result, McPatom is applicable to large software
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systems.

McPatom can predict atomicity violations that do not manifest during

testing or runtime.

Improving the coverage and precision of atomicity violation prediction
Predictive methods and tools need to consider the tradeos between precision and
coverage. An imprecise tool may report a large number of false positives and thus
is not very useful since it is extremely time-consuming if not impossible to manually validate all false positives.

On the other hand, a tool lacking coverage can

miss signicant real bugs and thus provides no assurance for software reliability.
This dissertation presents two methods for improving the coverage and precision of
atomicity violation predictions: 1) a post-prediction analysis method on relaxing the
under-approximate models to increase coverage while ensuring precision; and 2) a
follow-up replaying method to further increase coverage. The post-prediction analysis method is lightweight and fast, and makes the precise predictions and achieves
better coverage than other existing methods using under-approximate models. The
replaying method reduces context switches to the minimal level to improve scalability. Both methods are implemented in a completely automatic tool.

1.4 Chapter Organization
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents our
work in model checking Mondex, a grand challenge project, at the design level using
Petri nets. Chapter 3 presents a method to build models in Petri nets automatically
in the context of scientic workows. Chapter 4 describes our predictive analysis
tool for atomicity violation using model checking at code level. Chapter 5 explains
methods for improving the coverage and precision of atomicity violation prediction.
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CHAPTER 2

ANALYZING PETRI NETS USING MODEL CHECKING
In this chapter we build a formal specication of Mondex using Petri nets, and
provide a way of using model checking to verify the formal specication of Mondex,
including the abstract model and concrete model.

2.1 Overview
In recent years, both the Computing Research Association in the U.S. and the UK
Computing Research Committee proposed a set of grand challenges in computing
sciences. One common grand challenge proposed by the above organizations is on
developing dependable software systems [1] [2]. The Mondex smart card, an electronic purse, was chosen as the 1st pilot project in 2006.

The objectives were to

demonstrate how research groups can collaborate and compete in scientic experiments, and to generate artifacts to populate the veried software repository [3].
Mondex is a payment system, an electronic purse system, based on smart card
technology, which oers an alternative to paying cash for goods and services, allowing person-to-person payment. In 1999, Mondex was awarded a security rating of
ITSEC Level E6 [13] - the highest possible rating achievable in ITSEC (Information
Technology Security Evaluation Criteria).
During the development of Mondex, Z was used to specify and to prove the
correctness of Mondex design [14]. Since no network access was required for transaction, it demanded critically high security level on each Mondex purse itself.

Z

Specication was used to prove the following security properties of Mondex:

1. no value may be created in the system: the sum of all the purses' balances
does not increase; and
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2. all values must be accounted for in the system: the sum of all purses' balances
and lost components does not change.

The security properties were proved manually, which was evaluated by a third party
group, and a sanitized version of the proof was published in 2000 [13]. The proof
has critically helped Mondex be granted ITSEC security level 6 , the highest level.
In [15], we presented a formal specication of Mondex in

Sam

[16], a formal

software architecture model integrating high-level Petri nets and temporal logic. In
this section, we present a way using model checking to analyze the formal specication of Mondex in

Sam.

This formal specication and verication contributes to

the world wide eort on developing a veried software repository.

2.2 Specifying Mondex in Sam
A formal specication of Mondex in
a brief

Sam was developed in [15].

This section gives

Sam specication of the abstract model.

2.2.1

Sam

Sam [16], an architectural description model based on Petri nets and temporal logic,
is well-suited for modeling distributed systems. A Sam specication is hierarchical
consisting of multiple compositions.
ment. Each element

C = (B, S)

Each composition may contain multiple ele-

has a behavior model

Petri net [17]), and a property specication

S

S,

denoted by

B |= S .

The correctness of a

B

satises the property spec-

Sam architecture description

is dened recursively from the correctness of all elements.
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(modeled in a high level

(dened by a temporal logic formula).

An element is correctly designed if the behavior model
ication

B

A high level Petri net
is the net structure,

Spec

B

is a tuple

(P, T, F, Spec, ϕ, R, L, M0 )

(ϕ, R, L, M0 )

is the net inscription that maps

ϕ

net elements to terms in the algebraic specication.

M0

Spec. R

associates each transition in

T

associates each place in

with a boolean term in

is the initial marking which associates each place in

ground terms in

Spec.

(P, T, F )

is the underlying algebraic specication that denes the

static semantics of net elements, and

with a type in

where

P

P

Spec.

with type respecting

We assume that the reader has some knowledge of Petri nets

and temporal logic, and thus omit their formal denitions, which can be found in
[16]. In the sequel, we simply use Petri nets to refer to high level Petri nets.

2.2.2 The Abstract Model
In the Z Specication of Mondex [14],

ether

is used to model the communication

channel. Messages between purses could be lost, and also could be read by third
parties as there may be somebody eavesdropping, so
public, all request messages are initialized in

ether

ether .

reader via connector, contact or contactless.

Each purse interacts with card

Each purse accepts input from card

reader, which could be either an initial request in

ether ,

by another purse. Each purse produces an output to
Accordingly in the

is designed as lossy and

or the message sent out

ether .

Sam model of Mondex, two places, msg_in

and

msg_out ,

are used to model the communication channel, shown in Fig. 2.1, in which
contains tokens for input messages, and

msg_out

sages. All request messages are initialized in
messages from

msg_in .

All messages in

msg_in

contains tokens for output mes-

msg_in ,

and each purse accepts input

For output messages, each purse sends them to
comes from

ether ,

ether .
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msg_in

and all messages in

msg_out .

msg_out

goes to

msg_in

msg1

msg2

A1
AbIgnore

A2'
AbWorld

A1'

AbPurseTransfer
A2

msg2'

msg1'

msg_out

Figure 2.1: The Abstract Model

The abstract model has only one atomic operation to transfer balance from
paying purse to receiving purse. It corresponds to transition
Fig. 2.1. Transition

AbIgnore

AbPurseTransfer

in

is introduced in Fig. 2.1 to handle invalid messages.

The whole world of abstract purses is modeled using a power set of purses,

AbWorld .
The net inscription for abstract model is given below, which denes the types
of places, constraints of transitions, and the initial marking. The denition of arc
labels are omitted since they are self evident in Fig. 2.1.

The Types of Places
The type of

msg_in

eration can be

contains information of operations and parameters.

aNullIn

including the name of

or

transfer ,

from

An op-

and parameters provide transferring details

side (paying party), the name of

party), and the value to transfer. The type of

msg_in

side (receiving

is thus dened as below.

OP ={aN ullIn, transf er}
ϕ(msg _in) =OP × string × string × N
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to

(2.1)
(2.2)

The type of

AbWorld

is a power set of purses, in which each purse has 3 elds,

the rst eld denes the name of each purse, the second one denes balance and the
third one denes lost value.

ϕ(AbW orld) = P(string × N × N)
The type of

msg_out

is modeled as

(2.3)

aNullOut .

ϕ(msg _out) ={aN ullOut}

(2.4)

The Constraints of Transitions
The precondition of transition
eration

aNullIn ,

AbIgnore

tests that the message

and its postcondition keeps

AbWorld

msg1

contains op-

unchanged.

R(AbIgnore) =(msg1[1] = aN ullIn) ∧ (A10 = A1)
For transition
by

msg2

(2.5)

AbPurseTransfer , its inputs are a message from msg_in

and all abstract purses from

AbWorld

denoted by

is the constraint for transition

AbPurseTransfer ,

from

to

side and purse

n

is the

side, and
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m

A2 .

denoted

R(AbPurseTransfer)

which assures the purse

is not the same purse as

n.

m

is the
It also

updates the balance in abstract world.

R(AbP urseT ransf er) = (msg2 [1] = transf er) ∧
∃ (m ∈ A2, n ∈ A2)  (
m[1] = msg2[2] ∧ n[1] = msg2[3] ∧ msg2[2] 6= msg2[3]
∧ A20 = A2 \ {m, n} ∪
{(m[1], (m[2] − msg2[4]), m[3]),
(n[1], (n[2] + msg2[4]), n[3])
}
)
(2.6)

The Initial Marking
Any permissible initial marking can be provided.

To demonstrate the dynamic

behavior of our specication, the following initial marking is used.

M0 (msg _in) = {(transf er, 1, 2, 50)}
(2.7)

M0 (msg _out) = {}
M0 (AbW orld) = {{(P 1, 100, 0), (P 2, 200, 0), (P 3, 150, 0)}}

2.2.3 The Concrete Model of Mondex in Sam
The concrete model deals with the following security issues: (1) a purse could disconnect at any time due to power failure; (2) a message could be lost in the
the communication channel; and (3) messages in the

ether

ether ,

are public and could be

read by any purses.
The concrete model follows the protocol shown in Fig.
the transfer with the following messages sequence, message

13

2.2: The wallet starts

req ,

message

val ,

and

Figure 2.2: The Protocol in Concrete Model

msg_in
msg_req

msg_from

msg_ack

msg_to

startFrom

req

msg_out
CF

msg_out
msg_val

CR

CR'

CF'

CA'

ack
CA

CT
startTo

ConWorld
CV'

CT'

msg_out

C1

CV

C3'

val

C3
C1'
C2

msg_read

C2'

readExceptionLog

Abort

msg_clr

exceptionLogClear

msg_abort

msg_out

Figure 2.3: The Concrete Model

message

ack .

Message

startFrom

and

startTo

come from card reader, that is

triggered by pressing buttons with value to transfer.
Actually state

eaFrom

purse cannot stay in both

and

eaTo

eaFrom

can be merged into one state:

and

eaTo

Sam model, and msg_out

since a

states.

Fig. 2.3 shows a Petri net model of the concrete purse, in which
input port in

idle ,

is the output port in

msg_in

is the

Sam model.

There are seven operations that have corresponding transitions in Petri net
above, which are listed in Table 2.1.
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Table 2.1: Operations List
Operation Name

Operation Description

startFrom

The operation to process the initial message

startTo
req

startFrom

for paying purse.

The operation to process the initial message

startTo

for payee purse.

The operation to process message

req,

requesting

payment from paying purse.

val

The operation to process message

val,

transferring balance to payee purse.

ack

The operation to process message

ack,

conrming

the paying purse that the transfer is completed.

readExceptionLog

The operation to process message

readExceptionLog,

reading the exception log

from purse, and putting the output message into
ether.

ExceptionLogClear

The operation to process message

exceptionLogClear,

to clear the exception logs

in purse which are already in archive.

15

Following is the net inscription for the concrete model including types of places,
constraints of transitions. The initial markings and denitions of arcs are obvious
and thus are omitted.
There is one transition called
sage.

Abort

abort ,

which does not have a corresponding mes-

startFrom , startTo

is triggered in case the message input is

clearExceptionLog ,

and the purse state is

Operations interact with

CounterPartyDetails

ConWorld ,

consists of

epv

or

or

epa .

which is a power set of concrete purses.

name , value

and

nextSeqNo .

CP Details = N AM E × N × N

PayDetails

contains

TransferDetails , fromSeqNo , toSeqNo.

F ROM = N AM E
T O = N AM E
Xf erDetails = F ROM × T O × V ALU E
P ayDetails = Xf erDetails × N × N
The type of

msg_in

includes operation, parameter and name. Operations are

listed in Table 2.1 above. A parameter can be

CounterpartyDetails , or PayDetails ,

for corresponding operations. Name is used to specify which purse to receive the
message.

OP = {startF rom, startT o, readExceptionLog, req, val, ack,
exceptionLogResult, exceptionLogClear, f orged}
P ARAM = CP Details × P ayDetails
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Therefore, the type of

msg_in , is OP × P ARAM × N AM E , dened as follows.

ϕ(msg _in) =OP × N AM E × N × N
× F ROM × T O × V ALU E × N × N × N AM E
For

forged

dened in

OP ,

all messages emitted by any operation ignoring an

input message, or emitted by non-authentic purses, could be
The status can be
and

eaTo

req , epv
message

idle , epr , epv , epa . Idle

in Z Specication, the initial state,
is the state waiting for message

epr

value ,

forged .

is the one merged from

eaFrom

is the state waiting for message
and

epa

is the state waiting for

ack .
ST AT U S = {idle, epr, epv, epa}

ConPurse

is the concrete purse including elds: name of purse, balance, excep-

tion log, next sequence number, pay details and status.

ConP urse =N AM E × N × PP ayDetails × N × P ayDetails × ST AT U S
=N AM E × N × PP ayDetails × N × F ROM × T O × V ALU E
× N × N × ST AT U S

Message

is dened as the same as

msg_in .

M essage = msg _in

ConWorld
in which

is composed of a power set of concrete purses,

ether

is a power set of

Message ,
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ether ,

and

archive ,

for public communication channel, and

archive

is

LogBook ,

for persistent storage of exception logs.

LogBook =P(N AM E × P ayDetails)
=P(N AM E × F ROM × T O × V ALU E × N × N)
ϕ(ConW orld) =P(ConP urse) × PM essage × LogBook
ϕ(msg _out) =msg _in
As
set of

ConWorld

involves a power set of

PayDetails ,

thus making

ConPurse , and a ConPurse

ConWorld

a nested power set.

involves a power
Our tool under

development does not support nested power set for the consideration of simpling its
implementation, given the fact that there is always an equivalent non-nested power
set. For

ConPurse ,

ConWorld

we can transform it as below to remove power set, thus making

a non-nested power set. A

ConPurse

can have a set of

exception logs, so we use a bool to indicate emptiness of the set of
the size of the set of
into

ConWorld ,

PayDetails

with dierent

PayDetails

as

PayDetails .

If

is greater than 1, we can put another

ConPurse

PayDetails .

ConP urse =N AM E × N × bool × N × F ROM × T O × V ALU E
× N × N × ST AT U S × P ayDetails
=N AM E × N × bool × N × F ROM × T O × V ALU E
× N × N × ST AT U S × F ROM × T O × V ALU E
×N×N
The types of

ConPurse

and

msg_in

are summarized in Table 2.2 and Table 2.3

to facilitate understanding. The mapping relation can also be implemented in a tool
for syntax checking against the constraints in the future.
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Table 2.2: Summarization of type

ConPurse

Number

Type

Description

1

NAME

Name of purse

2

N

Balance

3

bool

Emptiness of exception log

4

N

Next Sequence Number

5

FROM

Name of paying side in
PayDetails

6

TO

Name of payee side in PayDetails

7

VALUE

Value to transfer in PayDetails

8

N

fromSeqNo in PayDetails

9

N

toSeqNo in PayDetails

10

STATUS

Status

11

FROM

Name of paying side in an
exception log

12

TO

Name of payee side in an
exception log

13

VALUE

Value to transfer in an exception
log

14

N

fromSeqNo in an exception log

15

N

toSeqNo in an exception log
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Table 2.3: Summarization of type

msg_in

Number

Type

Description

1

OP

Operation or message type

2

NAME

Name in CounterPartyDetails

3

N

Value in CounterPartyDetails

4

N

Next Sequence Number in
CounterPartyDetails

5

FROM

Name of paying side in
PayDetails

6

TO

Name of payee side in PayDetails

7

VALUE

Value to transfer in PayDetails

8

N

fromSeqNo in PayDetails

9

N

toSeqNo in PayDetails

10

NAME

Name of destination purse of this
message

The constraint of each transition consists of a precondition and a postcondition.
The precondition denes the enabling condition of a transition and the postcondition
denes the ring result of the transition. We only provide a detailed explanation
of the precondition and the postcondition of transition

startFrom .

For all other

transitions, we just give the formula dening its precondition and postcondition.
Transition

startFrom

denes the operation upon receiving

startFrom

message.

The precondition tests whether there is purse in concrete world meeting the following
conditions:

1. The purse's name matches the name specied in received message, and does
not equal the counterparty name in message;
2. The balance of the purse is greater than or equal to the value specied in

startFrom

message; and
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3. The purse is in state

idle .

The postcondition is as follows:
1. Its new

nextSeqNo

is greater than the one before ring transition;

2. Payment details are stored, as paying purse name, payee purse name, value to
transfer, paying purse
3. Move to

epr

nextSeqNo ,

payee purse

nextSeqNo ;

state;

4. No output message; and
5. The concrete world is updated with new purse and output message.

R(startF rom) = (msg _f rom[1] = startF rom)
∧∃(purse ∈ CF [1])  (
(purse[1] = msg _f rom[10]) ∧ (purse[1] 6= msg _f rom[2])
∧ (purse[2] ≥ msg _f rom[3]) ∧ (purse[10] = idle)
∧ (purse0 [1] = purse[1]) ∧ (purse0 [2] = purse[2])
∧ (purse0 [3] = purse[3]) ∧ (purse0 [11] = purse[11])
∧ (purse0 [12] = purse[12]) ∧ (purse0 [13] = purse[13])
∧ (purse0 [14] = purse[14]) ∧ (purse0 [15] = purse[15])
∧ (purse[4] < purse0 [4]) ∧ (purse0 [5] = purse[1])
∧ (purse0 [6] = msg _f rom[2]) ∧ (purse0 [7] = msg _f rom[3])
∧ (purse0 [8] = purse[4]) ∧ (purse0 [9] = msg _f rom[4])
∧ (purse0 [10] = epr) ∧ (msg _f rom0 = (f orged))
∧ (CF 0 [1] = CF [1] \ purse ∪ purse0 )
∧ (CF 0 [2] = CF [2] ∪ msg _f rom0 ) ∧ (CF 0 [3] = CF [3])
)
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Transition

startTo

denes the operation upon receiving message

startTo .

The

following formula denes the precondition and the postcondition of this transition:

R(startT o) = (msg _to[1] = startT o)
∧∃(purse ∈ CT [1])  (
(purse[1] = msg _to[10]) ∧ (purse[1] 6= msg _to[2])
∧ (purse[2] ≥ msg _to[3]) ∧ (purse[10] = idle)
∧ (purse0 [1] = purse[1]) ∧ (purse0 [2] = purse[2])
∧ (purse0 [3] = purse[3]) ∧ (purse0 [11] = purse[11])
∧ (purse0 [12] = purse[12]) ∧ (purse0 [13] = purse[13])
∧ (purse0 [14] = purse[14]) ∧ (purse0 [15] = purse[15])
∧ (purse[4] < purse0 [4]) ∧ (purse0 [5] = msg _to[2])
∧ (purse0 [6] = purse[1]) ∧ (purse0 [7] = msg _to[3])
∧ (purse0 [8] = purse[4]) ∧ (purse0 [9] = msg _to[4])
∧ (purse0 [10] = epv) ∧ (msg _to0 = (req, msg _to[2], msg _to[3],
msg _to[4], purse0 [5], purse0 [6], purse0 [7], purse0 [8],
purse0 [9], msg _to[2]))
∧ (CT 0 [1] = CT [1] \ purse ∪ purse0 )
∧ (CT 0 [2] = CT [2] ∪ msg _to0 ) ∧ (CT 0 [3] = CT [3])
)
Transition

req

is red upon receiving corresponding message in place

Its inputs are a message from
from

ConWorld

denoted by

msg_in

CR ,

denoted by

msg_req

and all concrete purses

its outputs are a message denoted by
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msg_in .

msg_req'

to

msg_out ,

and all concrete purses denoted by

CR'

to send back to

ConWorld

with necessary change. The precondition and the postcondition of transition

req

dened by the following formula:

R(req) = (msg _req[1] = req)
∧∃(purse ∈ CR[1])  (
(purse[1] = msg _req[10]) ∧ (purse[10] = epr)
∧ (purse0 [1] = purse[1]) ∧ (purse0 [2] = purse[2] − msg _req[7])
∧ (purse0 [3] = purse[3]) ∧ (purse0 [4] = purse[4])
∧ (purse0 [5] = purse[5]) ∧ (purse0 [6] = purse[6])
∧ (purse0 [7] = purse[7]) ∧ (purse0 [8] = purse[8])
∧ (purse0 [9] = purse[9]) ∧ (purse0 [10] = epa)
∧ (purse0 [11] = purse[11])
∧ (purse0 [12] = purse[12]) ∧ (purse0 [13] = purse[13])
∧ (purse0 [14] = purse[14]) ∧ (purse0 [15] = purse[15])
∧ (msg _req 0 = (val, msg _req[2], msg _req[3],
msg _req[4], purse0 [5], purse0 [6], purse0 [7], purse0 [8],
purse0 [9], msg _req[6]))
∧ (CR0 [1] = CR[1] \ purse ∪ purse0 )
∧ (CR0 [2] = CR[2] ∪ msg _req 0 ) ∧ (CR0 [3] = CR[3])
)
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is

Transition

val

denes the operation upon receiving message

dition and postcondition of transition

val

val .

The precon-

are dened by the following formula:

R(val) = (msg _val[1] = val)
∧∃(purse ∈ CV [1])  (
(purse[1] = msg _val[10]) ∧ (purse[10] = epv)
∧ (purse0 [1] = purse[1]) ∧ (purse0 [2] = purse[2] + msg _val[7])
∧ (purse0 [3] = purse[3]) ∧ (purse0 [4] = purse[4])
∧ (purse0 [5] = purse[5]) ∧ (purse0 [6] = purse[6])
∧ (purse0 [7] = purse[7]) ∧ (purse0 [8] = purse[8])
∧ (purse0 [9] = purse[9]) ∧ (purse0 [10] = idle)
∧ (purse0 [11] = purse[11])
∧ (purse0 [12] = purse[12]) ∧ (purse0 [13] = purse[13])
∧ (purse0 [14] = purse[14]) ∧ (purse0 [15] = purse[15])
∧ (msg _val0 = (ack, msg _val[2], msg _val[3],
msg _val[4], purse0 [5], purse0 [6], purse0 [7], purse0 [8],
purse0 [9], msg _val[5]))
∧ (CV 0 [1] = CV [1] \ purse ∪ purse0 )
∧ (CV 0 [2] = CV [2] ∪ msg _val0 ) ∧ (CV 0 [3] = CV [3])
)
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Transition

ack

denes the operation upon receiving message

ack .

The precon-

dition and the postcondition are dened by the following formula:

R(ack) = (msg _ack[1] = ack)
∧∃(purse ∈ CA[1])  (
(purse[1] = msg _ack[10]) ∧ (purse[10] = epa)
∧ (purse0 [1] = purse[1]) ∧ (purse0 [2] = purse[2])
∧ (purse0 [3] = purse[3]) ∧ (purse0 [4] = purse[4])
∧ (purse0 [5] = purse[5]) ∧ (purse0 [6] = purse[6])
∧ (purse0 [7] = purse[7]) ∧ (purse0 [8] = purse[8])
∧ (purse0 [9] = purse[9]) ∧ (purse0 [10] = idle)
∧ (purse0 [11] = purse[11])
∧ (purse0 [12] = purse[12]) ∧ (purse0 [13] = purse[13])
∧ (purse0 [14] = purse[14]) ∧ (purse0 [15] = purse[15])
∧ (msg _ack 0 = (f orged))
∧ (CA0 [1] = CA[1] \ purse ∪ purse0 )
∧ (CA0 [2] = CA[2] ∪ msg _ack 0 ) ∧ (CA0 [3] = CA[3])
)
Transition

readExceptionLog

readExceptionLog .

denes the operation upon receiving message

The precondition and the postcondition are dened below:

R(readExceptionLog) = (msg _read[1] = readExceptionLog)
∧∃(purse ∈ C1[1])  (
(purse[1] = msg _read[10]) ∧ (purse[10] = idle)
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∧ ((purse[3] = true) ∧ (msg _read0 =
(exceptionLogResult, msg _read[2], msg _read[3],
msg _read[4], purse[11], purse[12], purse[13],
purse[14], purse[15], msg _read[10]))
∨ (purse[3] = f alse ∧ msg _read0 = (f orged))
)
∧ (C10 [1] = C1[1]) ∧ (C10 [3] = C1[3])
∧ (C10 [2] = C1[2] ∪ msg _read0 )
)
Transition

clearExceptionLog

clearExceptionLog .

denes the operation upon receiving message

The precondition and the postcondition are dened below:

R(clearExceptionLog) = (msg _clr[1] = clearExceptionLog)
∧∃(purse ∈ C2[1])  (
(purse[1] = msg _clr[10]) ∧ (purse[10] = idle)
∧ (purse[3] = true) ∧ (msg _clr0 = (f orged))
∧ (purse0 [1] = purse[1]) ∧ (purse0 [2] = purse[2])
∧ (purse0 [3] = f alse) ∧ (purse0 [4] = purse[4])
∧ (purse0 [5] = purse[5]) ∧ (purse0 [6] = purse[6])
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∧ (purse0 [7] = purse[7]) ∧ (purse0 [8] = purse[8])
∧ (purse0 [9] = purse[9]) ∧ (purse0 [10] = purse[10])
∧ (C20 [1] = C2[1] \ purse ∪ purse0 )
∧ (C20 [2] = C2[2] ∪ msg _clr0 ) ∧ (C20 [3] = C2[3])
)
Transition

Abort

denes the operation to deal with exception. The precondition

and the postcondition are dened by the following formula:

R(Abort) = ((msg _abort[1] = startF rom) ∨ (msg _abort[1] = startT o)
∨ (msg _abort[1] = clearExceptionLog))
∧∃(purse ∈ C3[1])  (
(purse[1] = msg _abort[10])
∧ ((purse[10] = epv) ∨ (purse[10] = epa))
∧ (purse0 [1] = purse[1]) ∧ (purse0 [2] = purse[2])
∧ (purse0 [4] = purse[4])
∧ (purse0 [5] ≥ purse[5]) ∧ (purse0 [6] = purse[6])
∧ (purse0 [7] = purse[7]) ∧ (purse0 [8] = purse[8])
∧ (purse0 [9] = purse[9]) ∧ (purse0 [10] = idle)
∧ (purse0 [3] = true) ∧ (purse0 [11] = purse[5])
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∧ (purse0 [12] = purse[6]) ∧ (purse0 [13] = purse[7])
∧ (purse0 [14] = purse[8]) ∧ (purse0 [15] = purse[9])
∧ (C30 [1] = C3[1] ∪ purse0 )
∧ (C30 [2] = C3[2]) ∧ (C30 [3] = C3[3])
)
The denitions of arcs are self evident from Fig. 2.3.

2.3 Analyzing the Specication in Sam
Model checking is an automatic and eective method for analyzing nite state systems, which is well suited for this
to ensure

S.

B |= S ,

Sam specication.

that is the behavior model

The behavior model

B

B

In

Sam,

model checking is

satises the property specication

uses high level Petri net, which employs sets and power

sets as the type of places. The property specication

S

uses linear temporal logic.

Spin uses Promela as its input language to model the behavior, and uses linear
temporal logic to specify the properties. In order to use Spin for model checking
Sam specication, the behavior model B is translated to Promela code, and the
property specication

S

remains the same. Translation between formal models are

often useful, various issues with regard to formal model translation were discussed
in [18].

2.3.1

Spin and Promela

Spin [19] is a well known model checking tool used in the verication of nite state
systems. Promela, as the input language of Spin, consists of processes, channels,
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and variables. For the channels, there are operations to fetch messages from them
randomly or rst-in-rst-out, and to fetch the messages with desired eld value. It is
also possible to test the existence of desired messages in channels while not changing
anything.

Promela operator that returns the
rst message in the channel, double question mark "??" is a Promela operator
that returns the rst matched message in the channel, "[...]" is a Promela testing
Specically, single question mark "?" is a

operator returning true or false, while does not block the execution and does not
copy messages in the channel, and "<...>" is a

Promela channel poll operator

which copys a message without removing it from the channel if a desired message
exists in the channel. There is a predened unary function in
to turn an expression into a value. "!" is a

Promela called eval

Promela operator that sends a message

to the channel.

2.3.2 Rules to Translate High Level Petri Net to Promela
This section introduces the rules to translate a high level Petri net to

Promela,

with the abstract model of Mondex (Fig. 2.1) as the example, however, the rules
are also applied to the concrete model of Mondex for model checking discussed in
Section 2.4.

Before discussing the details of rules, we outline the translation by

explaining the mapping from a high level Petri net to

Promela code, as shown in

Table 2.4.
Without the loss of generality, we assume all the types in a Petri net model are
directly denable in

Promela in this section,

conversion before the translation.
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since we can always make a type

Table 2.4: Outline of mapping relationships from Petri Nets to
Petri Nets

Description

Places

Places contain tokens,while in

Promela

Promela channel

contains messages, thus places are translated into
channels.
Transitions

Each transition is translated into a

Promela

inline function.
Transition constraints

The contraints for each transition have 2 parts:
precondition and postcondition.

Initial markings

The initial marking is translated to initial
messages in the channel.

2.3.2.1 Step 1. Dene places as channels
Each place is translated into a
messages. Specically, let

p∈P

we dene a bounded channel in

Promela channel; and tokens are translated into
be a place in Petri net with type

ϕ(p) = s1 , s2 , ..., sn ,

Promela as follows.

# define Bound_p const
chan type_p = [ Bound_p ] of { s1 , s2 , ..., sn };
where

const

is a user dened positive integer value.

Line 5 in Section 2.5 is a

translation example of place AbWorld in Fig. 2.1 with type dened in Formula 2.3.

2.3.2.2 Step 2. Dene the inline functions for the precondition of a
transition
The inline function works like usual preprocessor macro. It is introduced here to
oer better translation structure and facilitate automated translation.
Formally, for each transition

t∈T

with constraint:

R(t) = P reCond(t) ∧ P ostCond(t)
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(2.8)

where

P reCond(t)

is the precondition of transition

condition of transition t.
logical conjunction

∧

t

and

P ostCond(t)

is the post-

R(t) contains basic relational expression connected through

or logical disjunction

variables on input arcs and

P ostCond(t)

∨,

in which

P reCond(t)

contains only

contains variables on output arcs with or

without variables on input arcs. Let

v ∈ L(p, t)

does not have a power set type. Let

v ∈ S, S ∈ L(p, t), S

denote a simple variable in case
has a power set type,

v
v

denotes a quantied variable. We assume the rst eld of either simple variables or
quantied variables be the key eld, and for those variables
eld, each reference of

v

is viewed as

v

containing only one

v[1].

We use the constraint (Formula 2.6) of transition

AbPurseTransfer

as an ex-

ample in this section, in which the part above the line is the precondition and the
part below the line is the postcondition.
We dene an inline function to check the enabledness of the precondition of each
transition.

First, we dene a boolean variable

value of the checking for transition

t,

t_is_enabled

to store the truth

with initialized value false, refer to Step 5

below. Second, for the elds of each simple variable or quantied variable, we dene
corresponding variables. Let
containing
for

n

i ∈ 2..n.

elds,

v

T Y P E(i)

be the name of simple variable or quantied variable

be the type of

ith

eld, we dene

T Y P E(i) v _f ieldi;

For example, we dene Line 29-30 in Appedix 2.5 for Formula 2.6.

Table 2.5 gives the general mapping for basic relational expression connected
through logical conjunction

∧ or logical disjunction ∨.

We use single question mark

for simple variables such that messages in the channel are retrieved in FIFO order,
and we use double question mark for quantied variables since existential quantication implies a search throughout the whole power set. We use "<...>" to make a
guard statement for

if

statement in

Promela, so that only in case there is a desired

message the statements following guard statement are executed and the matched
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Table 2.5: General Mapping from basic relational expressions in the precondition of
each transition in a Petri Net to
Basic Relational Expression

Promela Expressions
Promela Expressions

v[1] = Exp
type_p ? <eval(Exp),
where v ∈ L(p, t) , p ∈ P, t ∈ T and v is
v _f ield2, v _f ield3, ..., v _f ieldn>
a simple variable containing n elds, Exp
does not contain any rst eld.

∃(v ∈ S)  (v[1] = Exp)
where v ∈ S, S ∈ L(p, t) , p ∈ P, t ∈ T
and v is a quantied variable containing
n elds, Exp does not contain the rst

type_p ?? [eval(Exp),
v _f ield2, v _f ield3, ..., v _f ieldn]

eld of any quantied variable.

Table 2.6: Mapping from the precondition in Formula 2.6 to
Basic Relational Expression

Promela Expressions

Promela Expressions

msg2[1] = transf er

type_msg _in? < eval(transf er), msg2_f ield2,
msg2_f ield3, msg2_f ield4 >

m[1] = msg2[2]

type_AbW orld??[eval(msg2_f ield2), m_f ield2,
m_f ield3]

n[1] = msg2[3]

type_AbW orld??[eval(msg2_f ield3), n_f ield2,
n_f ield3]

msg2[2] 6= msg2[3]

msg2_f ield2 ! = msg2_f ield3

message is copied, for example, in Section 2.5, Line 31 is a guard statement for Line
60, where the matched message is copied to msg2_eld2 to msg2_eld4 for each
eld; and we use "[...]" to test the existence of messages in case a truth value is
needed for

if

statement and the matched message does not require a copy.

Table 2.6 gives the mapping for the precondition in Formula 2.6.
Line 26-37 in Section 2.5 is the resulted
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Promela code.

Table 2.7: General Mapping from basic relational expressions in the postcondition
of each transition in a Petri Net to
Basic Relational Expression

v[1] = Exp
v ∈ L(p, t) , p ∈ P, t ∈ T ,
variable containing n elds.

where

Promela Expressions
Promela Expressions

and

v

is a simple

S 0 = S\{v}

type_p ? eval(Exp),
v _f ield2, v _f ield3, ...,
v _f ieldn
type_p ?? eval(Exp),
v _f ield2, v _f ield3, ...,
v _f ieldn

where

v ∈ S, S ∈ L(p, t) , S 0 ∈ L(t, p) p ∈ P, t ∈ T , and
v is a quantied variable containing n elds,
v[1] = Expression is a part of the precondition.
v 0 = Exp
0
where v ∈ L(t, p) , p ∈ P, t ∈ T .

type_p ! Exp

S 0 = S ∪ {(Exp1 , Exp2 , ..., Expn )}
0
where S ∈ L(p, t), S ∈ L(t, p) , p ∈ P, t ∈ T .

type_p ! Exp1 , Exp2 , ..., Expn

2.3.2.3 Step 3. Dene the inline function for the postcondition of a
transition
For each transition, once its precondition is met, it can re. This section introduces
the rules to dene an inline function for the postcondition of a transition ring.
In the rules for the precondition, we test enabledness without moving any tokens,
thus as part of the postcondition we move tokens through input arcs. For a simple
variable

p

v

on an input arc a message from the head of channel obtained from place

is retrieved, according to the constraint

a simple variable
from place

p.

v0

v[1] = Exp

in the precondition.

For

on an output arc, a message is sent to the channel obtained

For a quantied variable

v ∈ S,

if

S 0 = S\{v}

is a part of the

postcondition, a message is retrieved by searching throughout the channel obtained
from place

p, according to the constraint v[1] = Exp in the precondition.

cases above, we need to deal with

{(Exp1 , Exp2 , ..., Expn )}is

∪{(Exp1 , Exp2 , ..., Expn )}

in case

Besides the

S 0 = S\{v} ∪

a part of the postcondition, by sending a message to the
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Table 2.8: Mapping from the postcondition in Formula 2.6 to
Basic Relational Expression

Promela Code

Promela Expressions

msg2[1] = transf er

type_msg _in?eval(transf er), msg2_f ield2,
msg2_f ield3, msg2_f ield4

A20 = A2\{m}

type_AbW orld??eval(msg2_f ield2), m_f ield2,
m_f ield3;

\{n}

type_AbW orld??eval(msg2_f ield3), n_f ield2,
n_f ield3;

∪{(m[1], (m[2] −
msg2[4]), m[3])}

type_AbW orld!msg2_f ield2,m_f ield2 −
msg2_f ield4, m_f ield3;

∪{(n[1], (n[2] +
msg2[4]), n[3])}

type_AbW orld!msg2_f ield3,n_f ield2 +
msg2_f ield4, n_f ield3;

channel obtained from place

p, using the values of (Exp1 , Exp2 , ..., Expn ).

gives the general mapping. After ring the transition,

t_is_enabled

Table 2.7

is set to false.

Table 2.8 gives the mapping for the postcondition in Formula 2.6, in which

m[1]

is replaced with

msg2_f ield2

and

n[1]

is replaced with

precondition since we do not declare variables in

msg2_f ield3

as the

Promela for the rst eld of each

simple variable or quantied variable.
Line 38-47 in Section 2.5 is the resulted

Promela code.

2.3.2.4 Step 4. Dene an inline function for each transition
Each transition has its precondition and postcondition, we dene an inline function
for each transition

t∈T

using the inline functions for its precondition and postcon-

dition. Firing transition is dened as atomic operations using

Promela keyword

atomic .
inline t ()
{
is_enabled_t () ; /* Set t_is_enabled to true / false */
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if
::

t_is_enabled -> atomic { fire_t () }

::

else -> skip

fi
}
For example, Line 48-54 in Section 2.5 is the inline function for transition

AbPurseTransfer

in Fig. 2.1.

2.3.2.5 Step 5. Dene a process for the whole net
The dynamic semantics of a Petri net is to non-deterministically re enabled transitions. We dene the following

Promela process with a loop to capture the dynamic

semantics of a Petri net.

proctype ModelName () {
bool t1_is_enabled = false ;
bool t2_is_enabled = false ;

...

bool tn_is_enabled = false ;
do
:: t1 ()
:: t2 ()

...

:: tn ()
od
}
where

T = {t1 , t2 , ...tn }.

For example, we dene a process as Line 55-62 in Section

2.5, for abstract model of Mondex in Fig. 2.1.
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2.3.2.6 Step 6. Dene the initial marking and run the processes
Let

P = {p1 , ..., pn }, for each place p ∈ P , with initial marking M0 (p) = {m1 , m2 , ...,

mk }.

We dene

sort_p ! mi

for each

i, i ∈ 1..k

and run the process

ModelName

dened in the steps above.

init {
type_p 1 ! m1 ;... type_p 1 ! mk1 ;
...
type_p n ! m1 ;... type_p n ! mkn ;
run ModelName ()
}
For example, we dene Line 63-67 in Section 2.5 for abstract model of Mondex
in Fig. 2.1, according to Formula 2.7.

2.3.3 Translation Correctness
Katz et al.

[18] proposed a framework for translating models and specications,

in which atomicity of transitions and variables with unspecied next values were
discussed as issues in translation.

In our work, we use the

atomic

keyword in

Promela to make the transition atomic, and we use temporal logic to specify the
postcondition for each variable.
We introduce the denitions of completeness and consistency before dening
translation correctness. Completeness ensures that each place, transition and initial
marking has its representation in

Promela code.

Denition 1. Translation Completeness:
a language construct in

Promela.
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Each entity in a Petri net is mapped to

Lemma 1. Given a Petri net N , there exists a Promela program PN representing
N.

Proof.

The rules in Section 2.3.2 cover the translation from

Consistency ensures that the

N

to

PN .

Promela code preserves the semantics of a Petri

net. While there are several well known semantic models of Petri nets, we adopt the
interleaving semantics, which is adequate for studying the system properties dened
in temporal logic.

Denition 2. Translation Consistency:
is preserved in

Promela

M0 to M1 t1... tn−1 Mn ,

where

ti (i ∈ N ∧ 0 6 i 6 n)

code.

The dynamic behaviour of a Petri net

The interleaved execution is a sequence

n > 0, Mi (i ∈ N ∧ 0 6 i 6 n)

is a transition ring.

S0 Run(pt0 )S1 Run(pt1 )... Run(ptn−1 )Sn ,
of values in variables dened in

where

Promela

σ =

is a marking and

code execution is

Si (i ∈ N ∧ 0 6 i 6 n)

σ0 =

is a snapshot

Promela code, and Run(pt )(i ∈ N ∧ 0 6 i 6 n)
i

denotes the execution of inline function

pti

translated from ti as the rules in Section

2.3.2.

Lemma 2. (Initial Marking Consistency) The initial marking of a Petri net N is
consistent with the initial values of variables in translated
Proof.

Promela PN .

According to Step 1 in Section 2.3.2, marked places are translated into chan-

nels, and Step 6 in Section 2.3.2, the initial marking is used to initialize the channel
variables. The initial marking of a Petri net
tial values of variables in translated
2.3.2,

S0

is mapped from

N

is

M0 ,

Promela PN .

and

is the snapshot of ini-

According to Step 6 in Section

M0 .

Lemma 3. (Semantic Consistency) PN bisimulates N .
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S0

Proof.

Let

σ

be an execution of

length of sequence
Base case,

n = k + 1,

n=k

N

simulates

by induction on the

σ = M0 to M1 t1... tk−1 Mk

that the claim holds, that is,

σ 0 = S0 Run(pt0 )S1 Run(pt1 )... Run(ptk−1 )Sk .
as the Step 2 in Section 2.3.2, the precondition of

mapping of precondition of

ptk

PN

It is the initial marking consistency proved above.

Suppose it is true for

If

we proof

n.

n = 0.

is consistent with

N,

tk ;

tk ,

as the Step 4 in Section 2.3.2,

Run(ptk )

Mk+1

So,

tk .

is the

as the Step 3 in Section 2.3.2, the postcondition of

is the mapping of postcondition of

obtained from ring

ptk

that is,

generates

Sk+1

is the mapping of

Sk+1 ,

Mk+1 ;

which denotes marking

σk+1 = M0 to M1 t1... tk Mk+1

is consistent with

0
σk+1
= S0 Run(pt0 )S1 Run(pt1 )... Run(ptk )Sk+1 .
The reverse direction is proved in the same way, hence,

Denition 3. Translation Correctness:

PN

bisimulates

N.

Translation correctness consists of transla-

tion completeness and translation consistency.

Theorem 1. Given a Petri net N , the Promela program

PN obtained from the

translation rules in Section 2.3.2 preserves the semantics of N .
Proof.

We prove the translation correctness by proving translation completeness

and consistency. It is straightforward from Lemma 1 to 3.

2.3.4 Analysis Result
There are two security properties to verify for Mondex [14], the details of these
properties are listed in Table 2.9.

Spin to verify the properties in exhaustive mode. Here
are the LTL properties we used in Spin to do verication, in which bal _sum =
We use the model checker

P

a∈A,A∈AbW orld

a[2]

is the sum of balances,
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lost_sum =

P

a∈A,A∈AbW orld

a[3]

is the

Table 2.9: The Properties of Mondex to Verify
Property Name

Property Description

All Value Accounted

all value must be accounted for in the system: the sum of
all purses' balances and lost components does not change.

No Value Created

no value may be created in the system: the sum of all the
purses' balances does not increase.

sum of lost amounts, and 450 is exactly the sum of

bal_sum

and

lost_sum

in all

initial marking.

 bal_sum + lost_sum = 450
 bal_sum 6 450

(2.9)
(2.10)

The verication result is that all these LTL properties are satised with given
initial marking.

2.4 Related Works
Several research groups around the world have tackled this 1st pilot project in
recent years.

In [20], Z/Eves was used to mechanize the original specication of

Mondex in Z [14], which took about eight weeks to complete the mechanization of
the entire specication, renement and its proof. In [21], Alloy was used to specify
Mondex and Alloy Analyzer was used to check the specication that resulted in the
discovery of several bugs. The specication and analysis took about 6 months for a
research internship to nish. [22] used the KIV to specify and verify Mondex using
a single renement, which took about one person month. [23] presented an Event-B
specication of Mondex using B4free, which consists of 10 levels, an abstract model
and 9 levels of renement. The development took approximately 2 weeks of total
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eort spread over several months. In [24], RAISE was used to specify Mondex. The
specication consists of three levels: abstract, intermediate, and concrete. Half of
the proofs were done automatically.
Other works on Mondex mainly focus on the automation of the proof of Mondex,
while [24] not only made eort on proof of Mondex, but also did some model checking
with limits such that there are only 2 purses in the world, and money is in the range
0 to 3, to reduce states as much as possible. Our approach using model checking
oers great scalability to verify the properties of Mondex.
Regarding the translation from Petri net to
unique way to translate high level Petri net to
proach to translate

Promela,
Promela.

this section oers a
[25] provides an ap-

Sam to Promela in which the embedded C code was used as

the main approach, while we do not use embedded C code. [26] had the similar idea
to ours on translation rules from Petri net to

Promela, but it only dealt with low

level Petri nets, while we propose an approach to translating high level Petri nets
to

Promela codes.

2.5 A Promela program translated from Abstract Model of
Mondex
1

# define BOUND_msg_in 10

2

# define BOUND_AbWorld 10

3

# define BOUND_msg_out 10

4

chan type_AbWorld =[ BOUND_AbWorld ] of { short , int , int };

5

mtype = { aNullIn , transfer };
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6

chan type_msg_in = [ BOUND_msg_in ] of { mtype , short , short
, int };

7

mtype = { aNullOut };

8

chan type_msg_out = [ BOUND_msg_out ] of { mtype };

9

int bal_sum = 450 , lost_sum = 0 , seed = 0 , last_seed = 0;

10

inline is_enabled_AbIgnore () {

11

short msg1_field2 ; short msg1_field3 ; int msg1_field4 ;

12

type_msg_in ? < aNullIn , msg1_field2 , msg1_field3 ,
msg1_field4 > ->
AbIgnore_is_enabled = true

13
14

}

15

inline fire_AbIgnore () {
type_msg_in ? aNullIn , msg1_field2 , msg1_field3 ,

16

msg1_field4 ;
AbIgnore_is_enabled = false

17
18

}

19

inline AbIgnore () {

20

is_enabled_AbIgnore () ;

21

if

22

::

AbIgnore_is_enabled -> atomic { fire_AbIgnore () }

23

::

else -> skip

24

fi

25

}

26

inline is_enabled_AbPurseTransfer () {

27

short msg2_field2 , msg2_field3 ; int msg2_field4 ;

28

int m_field2 , m_field3 , n_field2 , n_field3 ;
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type_msg_in ? < transfer , msg2_field2 , msg2_field3 ,

29

msg2_field4 >;
30

if

31

::

msg2_field2 != msg2_field3 &&
type_AbWorld ??[ eval ( msg2_field2 ) , m_field2 , m_field3 ]

32

&&
type_AbWorld ??[ eval ( msg2_field3 ) , n_field2 , n_field3 ]

33

->
AbPurseTransfer_is_enabled = true

34
35

::

36

fi

else -> skip

37

}

38

inline fire_AbPurseTransfer () {
type_msg_in ? transfer , msg2_field2 , msg2_field3 ,
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msg2_field4 ;
40

type_AbWorld ?? eval ( msg2_field2 ) , m_field2 , m_field3 ;

41

type_AbWorld ?? eval ( msg2_field3 ) , n_field2 , n_field3 ;

42

atomic { type_AbWorld ! msg2_field2 , m_field2 - msg2_field4
, m_field3 ;

43

bal_sum = bal_sum - msg2_field4 ;}

44

atomic { type_AbWorld ! msg2_field3 , n_field2 + msg2_field4
, n_field3 ;

45

bal_sum = bal_sum + msg2_field4 ;}

46

AbPurseTransfer_is_enabled = false

47

}

48

inline AbPurseTransfer () {
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49

is_enabled_AbPurseTransfer () ;

50

if

51

::

AbPurseTransfer_is_enabled -> atomic {
fire_AbPurseTransfer () }

52

::

53

fi

else -> skip

54

}

55

proctype AbstractMondex () {

56

bool AbIgnore_is_enabled = false ;

57

bool AbPurseTransfer_is_enabled = false ;

58

do

59

:: AbIgnore ()

60

:: AbPurseTransfer ()

61

od

62

}

63

init {

64

type_msg_in ! transfer ,1 ,2 ,50; type_AbWorld !1 ,100 ,0;

65

type_AbWorld !2 ,200 ,0; type_AbWorld !3 ,150 ,0;

66

run AbstractMondex ()

67

}

2.6 Summary
We provide a way of using model checking to verify the formal specication of
Mondex in

Sam [15], including the abstract model and concrete model. this section

is presented with the abstract model as an example.
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Eort
It took us two person months to complete the specication[15], and 80 person-hours

Sam model into Promela code for Mondex concrete model and to
verify the model automatically using Spin.
to translate the

Bugs found
[21] found three bugs in the Z specication, in which one bug is for missing constraints about authenticity, also found by KIV method [22], two bugs are related
with reasoning errors during renement. For the authenticity bug, Z specication
gives no constraints for authenticity so that a purse could be making a transaction
with a non-authentic purse. For example, a purse is in
waiting for
ceiving

val

req

epv status, which is to

purse,

message, there should be constraints preventing this purse from re-

message as

preventing the purse in

from

epa

purse.

status as

Similarly there should also be constraints

from

purse from receiving

val

message as

to

purse. Without these constraints for authenticity, the actual role of purse could be
inconsistent in the transaction. The other two bugs are both for reasoning errors
during renement which is not present in this section as we using model checking
do not do that renement. Our specication avoids the authenticity bug through
adding proper constraints and does not have renement bugs.

Scalability
We conducted the model checking of Mondex concrete model with a Windows based
PC which has 1.8Ghz CPU and 2GB memory.

Since the Mondex system is not

a network system and only contains atomic operations involving two purses; it is
adequate to model and analyze the system with one randomly chosen initial message.
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Figure 2.4: Scalability of Model Checking on Mondex
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Therefore, we created a random message in the initial markings, the range for value
of money was

0 . . . 231 −1.

We conducted an experiment by increasing the number of

purses in the initial markings, to show the scalability of memory usage, cpu timing
and allocated state vector, as the Fig. 2.4 below.
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CHAPTER 3

A METHOD TO MINE TRACES FOR BUILDING PETRI NETS TO
AID DESIGNING SCIENTIFIC WORKFLOWS
In this chapter, we develop methods to mine traces to build Petri nets automatically to aid designing scientic workows.

3.1 Using Existing Process Mining Algorithms
This section presents existing process mining algorithms using scientic workows as
examples. Section 3.1.1 presents a method using process mining based on provenance
to create and analyze scientic workows. Figure 3.1 shows a high level view of the
context to mine provenance.

Applying process mining in the context of scientic

workow needs to address the following issues. In this section we focus on control
ow mining, and discuss the other two issues in Section 3.1.4.

1. Control ow mining: To mine control ows from provenance, we need to extract information and to present it in the format acceptable to existing process
mining tools. We also need to select appropriate process discovery algorithms
depending on the context of scientic workows.
2. Data dependency: Data dependency contained in provenance can contribute
to process mining for improving the mining results. It is critical to enhance
the existing control ow based process mining algorithms with data ow capabilities.
3. Incremental mining: Given a scientic workow template [27], scientists need
to ne-tune it many times, which makes updating large scientic workows
a challenge for scientists.

Mining from scratch is neither ecient for large

scale scientic workows nor eective to address existing scientic workow
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Figure 3.1: Mining provenance

templates. Incremental mining can utilize the information in existing scientic
workow templates to make mining more ecient and eective.

Section 3.1.2 presents a method to convert provenance to XES format that is accepted by existing process mining tools, and provides a method using process mining
to create and analyze scientic workows. Section 3.1.3 contains a brief discussion
of related works.

Section 3.1.4 discusses our research direction for using process

mining to address specic issues in the context of scientic workows.

3.1.1 Overview
Provenance, in scientic workow community, refers to the sources of information,
including entities and processes, involved in producing or delivering an artifact.
More specically, provenance is captured at four levels [28].

First, the process

level captures information about the invoked processes, their inputs/outputs and
start/end times.

Second, the data level, inferred from the process level, provides

derivation paths of intermediate and nal products. Third, the organization level
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stores the metadata for the experiments. Fourth, the knowledge level connects the
scientic experiments' discovery with other provenance levels as supporting evidence.
The stored information is used to infer the provenance of intermediate and nal
results and to verify the quality of the data through tracing the processing steps.
Recent eorts from the scientic workow community aiming at large-scale capturing of provenance present a new opportunity for building scientic workow using
provenance. Several researchers [29] have investigated how to synthesize a process
model from event logs.

The research area of process mining focuses on extract-

ing information about processes by examining event logs. Practical experience has
shown that typical information recorded in event logs includes information about
which activities are performed, at what time, by whom and in the context of which
case (i.e., process instance). By explicitly using the case context, process discovery
algorithms are capable of constructing process models that accurately describe the
process [29]. Since both event logs and provenance contain process information, a
given scientic workow may be executed multiple times [30] thus creating multiple
workow execution instances. Scientic experiments are exploratory in nature thus
change are the norm. As a result, mining processes from scientic workows is highly
valuable. Provenance does not record control ows associated no data ows, we are
interested in building scientic workows by combining data ows from provenance
and control ows mined from provenance.

Our work provides a new direction in

using captured provenance.

3.1.1.1 Process Mining and XES format of ProM tool
The goal of process mining, or more specically control ow discovery is to extract
information about processes from event logs, such that the control ow of a process
is captured in a process model. In process mining an activity refers to an atomic
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part of a process, which may be executed over any length of time and by anyone.
We refer to a case (also a process instance) as the execution trace of a process. The
starting point for control ow discovery is an event log that contains events such
that:

1. Each event refers to an activity (i.e., a well-dened step in the process),
2. Each event refers to a case (i.e., a process instance) and
3. Events are totally ordered (for example by a timestamp).

The (Pro)cess (M)ining framework ProM [31] has been developed as a generic opensource framework where various process mining algorithms have been implemented.
Currently, over 280 plug-ins have been added. The framework provides researchers
an extensive base to implement new algorithms in the form of plug-ins. The framework provides easy to use user interface functionality, a variety of model type implementations (e.g. Petri nets) and common functionality like reading and writing les.
In most cases the starting input is an event log. ProM can read event logs stored in
the formats MXML [32] and from Version 6 also in the new event log format XES
[33]. For more information on process mining and the ProM framework, we refer to
the website www.processmining.org.
XES is an open standard for storing and managing event log data. Its objective
is to provide a generic framework onto which all event log meta-models found in
practice can be mapped with relative ease, without assuming a specic eld of
application, or any purpose of the event logs whatsoever.

The XES meta-model

recognizes and treats all extensions as equal, independent from their source or level
of proliferation. This allows users to extend it at will to t any purpose or domain
setting, and thus makes XES a exible format for all applications.

Due to the

exible handling of extensions, and the attributes dened by those, the XES meta-
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model allows using applications to interpret also previously unknown information.
To provide universally understood semantics, a number of extensions have been
standardized, and thus equipped with a xed semantics. The currently standardized
extensions include concept extension, lifecycle extension, organizational extension,
time extension, semantic extension and classication extension.

3.1.2 A Method to Build Scientic Workows from Provenance
Figure 3.1 shows a high level view of the context to mine provenance, to build and
update scientic workows. This section uses provenance generated from scientic
workow management systems, thus results of the method in this section can be
compared with existing scientic workows. Note that the method can be applied
to provenance from both sources in Figure 3.1. Figure 3.2 shows a high level view
of the method presented and evaluated in this section.

3.1.2.1 Converting Provenance to XES format
XESame [33] is a tool to extract event logs from a data source.
consists of two steps: conversion denition and execution.

The conversion

Conversion denition

species a mapping, to map concepts of the data source onto concepts of the event
log. Conversion execution produces event logs as specied in the mapping. In this
section, we use XESame to convert provenance to event logs as the input for process
mining tool ProM.
In conversion denition, the most important extension is the concept extension
that includes instances and names.
it is very informative.

Providing names for each event is desired as

Names of events are the names of the executed activity
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Figure 3.2: Overview of the method

represented by the event.

Instances represent identiers of the activity instances

whose executions have generated the events.
time extension.

Another important extension is the

Time extension species a timestamp attribute for events, which

enables events to be ordered to infer control dependency, and enables performance
analysis. For example, using Taverna provenance system, shown in Figure 3.3, we
join two tables PROCESSORENACTMENT and PROCESSOR on their PROCESSORID, PROCESSORENACTMENT provides event identiers and corresponding
start time while PROCESSOR provides a event name for each event identier. Since
we need steps in scientic workow and corresponding start time, we set instance
as PROCESSORID, name as PROCESSORNAME, and timestamp as ENACTMENTSTARTED.
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Figure 3.3: Conguration of XESame

3.1.2.2 Building Scientic Workows through Process Discovery
The Running Example

We adopt the challenge workow from the third Prove-

nance Challenge as an example (http://www.myexperiment.org/workows/750), which
contains both control ow and data ow. While there are several teams implemented
the challenge workow, we choose Taverna as it is connected well to the open scientic workow repository myExperiment. Provenance provided by Taverna records
the tasks executed and its timestamp, together with data links between tasks. As
the ongoing research work [7] and [34], the provenance in the near future will be
applicable to non-workow systems that enable provenance to record tasks users perform in their familiar environment, so that the methods investigated in this section
are able to build scientic workows automatically.

Using the Fuzzy Miner

The fuzzy miner [35] assumes that problems in mining

large scale processes are caused by mismatch between fundamental assumptions of
traditional process mining, and the characteristics of real-life processes. Fuzzy miner
developed an adaptive simplication and visualization technique for process models,
which is based on two metrics, signicance and correlation.
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The two metrics are

similar to the concept of data clustering domain where a binary distance metric is
inferred to nd related subsets of attributes. In the context of scientic workows,
signicance, which can be determined both for tasks and precedence relations over
them, measures the relative importance of behavior. As such, it species the level of
interest we have in tasks and their control dependency. Correlation is only relevant
for precedence relations over tasks, which measures how closely related two events
following one another is.
As scientic workows are usually quickly evolving, change can be made to the
example workow several times, including the activities and data. Using the fuzzy
miner, a workow can be mined to provide an abstract view of what does not change,
which oers insight of evolving workows. For the running example, we run it for
10 times, then remove ReadCSVReadyFile and run it for 10 times again, after that
we undo removing ReadCSVReadyFile, remove IsMatchCSVFileTables and run it
for 10 times. Using XESame provenance can be transformed to a XES le, based on
which the fuzzy miner can be applied. Figure 3.4 shows a resulting model in which
there is every task but IsMatchCSVFileTables, when signicance cuto is increased
to 0.392, as Figure 3.5, ReadCSVReadyFile disappeared so that the unchanged part
is shown, which can be the key part of the whole workow. What's more, by double
clicking Cluster 14 that contains 2 elements, the tasks with low signicance are
shown, which in our context is the changing tasks. As Figure 3.6 shows, there is a
process model related with low signicance tasks, which exactly matches the original
workow model in the running example. Therefore, in case there is provenance from
either workow based systems or non-workow systems that include tasks scientists
perform, a scientic workow can be built automatically at dierent abstract level
by using the fuzzy miner.
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Figure 3.4: Fuzzy Mining Result - 1

Figure 3.5: Fuzzy Mining Result - 2
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Figure 3.6: Fuzzy Mining Result - 3

Using the Alpha Miner

The alpha miner assumes the completeness of direct

succession (DS) such that  if two transitions can follow each other directly, then this
has occurred at least once in the log , yet it may not be the case in reality, the alpha
miner allow users to edit log relations manually to oer more information about direct succession, as shown in Figure 3.7. For large amount of events, manually adding
log relations can be impossible. In scientic workows context, provenance contains
data dependencies that imply direct succession in time order, data dependencies can
somehow be considered in the alpha miner thus making it closer to completeness of
direct succession. We discuss further about data dependencies in Section 3.1.4.

Using the Genetic Miner

The genetic miner is a control-ow process min-

ing algorithm that can discover all the common control-ow structures (i.e.

se-

quences, choices, parallelism, loops and non-free-choices, invisible tasks and duplicate tasks) while being robust to noisy logs.

The genetic miner has more dif-

culties to mine models with constructs that allow for many interleaving situations.

Figure 3.8 shows the result of the genetic miner on the running exam-
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Figure 3.7: Alpha Mining Result

ple.

Genetic miner successfully get a non-free-choices construct such as both Is-

MatchTableRowCount and IsMatchTableColumnRanges depend on UpdateComputedColumns while IsMatchTableRowCount depends on others as well that means
mixture of choice and synchronization. It also successfully suggests the dependency
between IsMatchTableRowCount and IsMatchTableColumnRanges that is a control
link in the running example. The results also give a clear view of frequency by annotating numbers on each event and arc, where numbers in event boxes mean how
many times the events happen in the event logs, and numbers on arcs mean how
many times the two events directly succeed each other.

Using the Heuristic Miner

The heuristics Miner is a practical applicable mining

algorithm that can deal with noise, and can be used to express the main behavior (i.e.
not all details and exceptions) registered in an event log [36]. It includes three steps:
(1) the construction of the dependency graph, (2) for each activity, the construction
of the input and output expressions and (3) the search for long distance dependency
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Figure 3.8: Genetic Mining Result

relations. Figure 3.9 shows the result of heuristics miner on the running example.
Although IsMatchCSVFileTables does not directly succeed ReadCSVReadyFile in
event logs, heuristics miner successfully suggests their dependency with reliability
0.833 and it happens 5 times in event logs considering long distance dependency
relations. This is particularly useful in the context of scientic workows, just as
the running example, many scientic workows have multiple tasks even hundreds
of tasks scheduled in parallel, not each parallel task succeed the dependent task
directly in provenance, therefore, long distance dependency discovery is especially
important in the context of scientic workows.

3.1.2.3 Analyzing Scientic Workows
Using LTL Checking

The size of provenance is growing large quickly, Linear

Temporal Logical (LTL) checking is a great tool to help scientists discovering and
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Figure 3.9: Heuristic Mining Result

double checking temporal properties of provenance. As shown in Figure 3.10, we can
easily check whether ReadCSVFileColumnNames eventually happens when IsExistsCSVFile happens, it is true for 27 instances while false for 4 instances, for further
information, the specic workow run can be referred to according to workow run
identier.

Figure 3.10: LTL Checking Example
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Figure 3.11: Dotted Chart Analysis

Using Dotted Chart

A dotted chart oers insight of performance during scien-

tic workow execution, thus enables improving the performance of a workow by
exploiting an episodic memory of prior workow executions. Figure 3.11 shows part

1

of the result using dotted chart analysis on an example , in which each row is a
task in workow and each dot is an occurrence of the corresponding task along the
time scale, so we can easily see the performance of scientic workow execution in
the perspective of tasks and take corresponding actions such as distributing tasks
further.

3.1.3 Related Works
The cloud computing and other technologies are changing the way we create, share
and use information, which oers great benets but also exposes us to serious new
problems. [34] believes that provenance will play an essential role in this revolution,
providing data integrity, trustworthiness, authenticity, and availability, while oering potential benets to information retrieval, collaboration, and scientic computation. [37] aims at mining provenance, by applying Case Based Reasoning (CBR)
methods to provenance to support scientists' workow generation process, which
does not generate the whole workow but focusing on assisting workow composi-

1 http://www.myexperiment.org/workows/158.html
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tion by providing recommendation to scientists regarding each interested task. [38]
addresses the queries from the provenance challenge workshop such as semantic reasoning which exposes the implicit links between provenance, e.g. the implicit links
between provenance of studying any part of a human's body including chest, legs,
arms and etc. An abstraction over the provenance information is presented by two
means: one is the users' specied annotations that draw an interpretative link between tasks, and the other is the typed views that hide or expose the execution
details of an iteration or a nested run, or the data lineage of a collection and its
elements. Other works such as [39], [40] and [41] also address the queries from the
provenance challenge workshop, however do not deal with mining processes from
provenance.

3.1.4 Discussion
3.1.4.1 Results of dierent process discovery algorithms
Section 3.1.2.2 presents results of four dierent process discovery algorithms on
the running example.

Table 3.1 discusses the results in the context of scientic

workows. Note that the result of each miner is correct based on given provenance,
but providing dierent views of the provenance. It is found that the result of the
fuzzy miner is closest to the original scientic workow in the running example.
Section 3.1.4.3 discusses a possible way to improve the results in Table 3.1.

3.1.4.2 Number of Traces in Provenance
As Figure 3.2 shows, this section uses provenance from scientic workow management systems.

A question that current tools can not address is how many times

should the scientic workow be run to get enough traces. There should be a xed
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Table 3.1: Discussion on results of process discovery algorithms
Description

Result

Fuzzy

Provides a zoom-able view

Under certain signicance cuto, the

Miner

of scientic workows by

fuzzy miner successfully gives the

controlling signicance

changed part and unchanged part.

cuto to show tasks at

Comparing with original scientic

dierent importance level.

workow, the fuzzy miner gets most
dependency correctly, but concludes
some dependency that does not exist.

Alpha

Provides a view of direct

Assuming the completeness of direct

Miner

succession between tasks

succession, the alpha miner fails to

in provenance.

give a view close to the original
scientic workow.

Genetic

Provides a view of

The genetic miner gets a good view of

Miner

frequency for both tasks

structures and frequencies, yet gives

and succession between

some wrong dependencies which does

tasks, and discovers all

not exist in both the original scientic

common control-ow

workow and the results of the fuzzy

structures assuming the

miner.

existence of noise.
Heuristic

Provides a view of

The heuristic miner gives long

Miner

scientic workows by

distance dependency successfully, but

considering long distance

gives too much dependency for some

dependency.

tasks such as
ReadCSVFileColumnNames.
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point after that no more precedence relations to be discovered even given additional
provenance. This section manually nd a point after that the mined results do not
change signicantly with additional provenance.

3.1.4.3 Build Scientic Workows using Data Dependency
Scientic workows include data dependency and control dependency, provenance
provides data dependency besides temporal sequences. The method provided in this
section only uses the temporal sequences of tasks in provenance to mine dependency
among tasks. Data dependency can contribute to process mining for improving the
mining result, but process mining and its existing tools do not accept explicit data
dependency as source. Since provenance provides data dependency, we can derive
causality relation from data dependency, which compliments the causality relation
extracted from the precedence of tasks.

3.1.4.4 Incremental Scientic Workow Mining
Scientic problem solving is an evolving process. Scientists start with a set of questions then observe phenomenon, gather data, develop hypotheses, perform tests,
negate or modify hypotheses, reiterate the process with various data, and nally
come up with a new set of questions, theories, or laws. Often before this process
can end in results, scientists will ne-tune the experiments, going through many
iterations with dierent parameters [28]. Updating scientic workows is hence a
challenge for scientists. We believe with pre-existing scientic workow template,
created either manually or automatically through mining, we can apply process
mining to update it based on new provenance obtained from either workow based
systems or non-workow systems. We are working on incremental scientic workow mining.

Incremental mining can utilize the information in existing scientic
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workow templates to make mining more ecient for large scale scientic workows
and more eective for addressing existing scientic workow templates.

3.1.5 Conclusion
This section provides a method using process mining to build and analyze scientic
workows, which oers a new approach to build large scale workows in the context of scientic workows. Recent eorts from scientic workow community on
capturing provenance present a new opportunity for using provenance. This section
presents a method using process mining based on provenance to build and analyze
scientic workows, which provides a new direction in using captured provenance.
Given the fact that provenance captured in any scientic workow based systems or
system level monitoring systems contains information about tasks and their temporal order, there is always a way to translate the provenance to XES format acceptable
to process mining tools, the method provided in this section can be applied to any
scientic workow management systems.

3.2 A Method to Mine Petri Nets by Improving Process Mining Algorithms with Data Dependency
This section presents a method of improving process mining algorithms with data
dependency. The method is applied to nd a scientic workow model from provenance and to provide recommendation support during scientic workows composition based on the mined workows, as shown in Figure 3.12.
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Figure 3.12: Background of the method described in this section (denoted by solid
arrows)

3.2.1 What are Scientic Workows and Provenance?
There are many works on scientic workows and provenance, that use dierent terminology for scientic workows and dierent ways to organize provenance
[42][43][28][5]. The common basics of scientic workow and provenance this section
relies on are given as follows.
A

task

ities.
A

A

is a procedure or a group of procedures to execute computational activ-

data product

scientic workow

can be a single data object or a collection of data objects.
is a directed graph where nodes are tasks and edges between

nodes represent either data dependency or control dependency.

Provenance

records

the task invocations and data products used or generated by each invocation. Formally,

P rovenance ⊆ P(Data × T ask × Data) . Data dependency

between two tasks
Formally,

t1 ≺d t2

P rovenance

t1
i

and

t2

when

t2

need

t1 's

is the relationship

output as input, denoted as

t 1 ≺d t 2 .

∃d1 , d2 , d3 ∈ Data  (d1 , t1 , d2 ) ∈ P rovenance ∧ (d2 , t2 , d3 ) ∈

. Data dependency can be derived from provenance as causality rela-

tion pairs, such as

t1 ≺d t2 . Control dependency

is the relationship between two

tasks t1 and t2 when a task t1 is required to be invoked before invoking another task

t2 ,

it is denoted as a causality relation pair

t1 ≺c t2 .

A

data dependency or control dependency, denoted as
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causality relation pair

infers

task trace,

corre-

t1 ≺ t2 .

A

sponds to a run of a scientic workow, is a sequence of task invocations. Formally,
let

Σ

be the set of all tasks that appear in task traces, a task trace is a sequence of

task invocations, denoted as

t1 , t2 , t3 , ..., tm

where

ti ∈ Σ

for

1 ≤ i ≤ m.

3.2.2 Scientic Workow Models in Petri Nets
The algorithm in this section mines a Petri net as a model to represent a scientic
workow.

Tasks are modeled by transitions and causal relations are modeled by

places and arcs.

A place corresponds to a condition which can be used as pre-

condition and/or post-condition for tasks. An AND-split corresponds to a transition
with two or more output places, and an AND-join corresponds to a transition with
two or more input places. OR-splits/OR-joins correspond to places with multiple
outgoing/ingoing arcs.
This section uses WF-nets [44] that is based on Place/Transition nets, a variant
of the classic Petri net model.

Denition 4.

Place/Transition nets

A Place/Transition net, or simply a P/T-net, is a tuple

1.

P

is a nite set of places,

2.

T

is a nite set of transitions such that

3.

F ⊆ (P × T ) ∪ (T × P )

4.

M : P →N

A place

p

P ∩ T = ∅,

(P, T, F, M )

where

and

is a set of directed arcs.

is a function that associate each place with a natural number.

is an input place of a transition

directed arc from the place

p

t,

also called pre-condition, if there is a

to the transition

t,

i.e.

(p, t) ∈ F .

is an output place of a transition t, also called post-condition, if
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Similarly a place p

(t, p) ∈ F .

Figure 3.13: A sample workow (the circle arrow denotes control dependency, and
the other arrows denote data dependency)

Denition 5.
Let

N

Workow nets

N = (P, T, F, M )

be a P/T-net and

t0

be a transition such that

t0 ∈
/ P ∪ T,

is a workow net (WF-net) i:

1. Object creation:

P

2. Object completion:
3. Connectedness:

contains an input place

P

i

such that

contains an output place

o

•i = ∅,

such that

N 0 = (P, T ∪ {t0 }, F ∪ {(o, t0 ), (t0 , i)})

o• = ∅,

is strongly connected.

3.2.3 A Simple Example
To illustrate the principle of the algorithm in this section, we consider the task trace
extracted from provenance shown in Table 3.2. Suppose the workow that generated
the provenance is given in Figure 3.13. Consider the fact that scientic workows
evolve quickly thus the change is recorded in provenance, and provenance capturing
systems support non-workow environment, the workows behind the provenance
are often unknown before mining.

Since the control ow does not generate any

data product, we cannot get the control ow from provenance. This section aims at
mining the control dependency from provenance to provide recommendation support
during workow composition.
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Table 3.2: A task trace in provenance
Workow Running Identier

Task Identier

1

a

2

a

1

b

2

e

1

c

2

b

2

c

1

d

2

d

1

e

Table 3.3: Direct precedence table
a

b

c

d

e

a

0

1

0

0

1

b

0

0

2

0

0

c

0

0

0

2

0

d

0

0

0

0

1

e

0

1

0

0

0

3.2.4 Construction of a Causality Table
Denition 6.
For

n

Direct precedence table

tasks, the direct precedence table is a

1 ≤ i, j ≤ n

and

pij

n×n

is the number of times that task

ti

matrix

P , P = [pij ]

directly precede task

where

tj .

Using the example above, a direct precedence table is shown in Table 3.3.

Denition 7.
For

n

Indirect precedence table

tasks, the indirect precedence table is a

1 ≤ i, j ≤ n

and

sij

is calculated as follows. For task

run, if there is a sequence

tm

is

m − k + 1,

add

n×n

ti , tk , ..., tm , tj ,

δ m−k+1 (δ = 0.8)

matrix

ti

and

S , S = [sij ]

tj ,

where

in each workow

suppose the number of tasks from

to
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sij .

tk

to

0.8 is chosen after experimentation

Table 3.4: Indirect precedence table
a

b

c

d

e

a

0

0.8

1.44

1.152

0.512

b

0

0

0

1.6

0.64

c

0

0

0

0

0.8

d

0

0

0

0

0

e

0

0

0.8

0.64

0

Table 3.5: Weight table
a

b

c

d

e

a

0

3.8

3.44

1.152

3.512

b

0

0

2

1.6

0.64

c

0

0

0

4

0.8

d

0

0

0

0

1

e

0

1

0.8

0.64

0

which satises two requirements: 1) for direct precedence,

δ m−k+1 = 1; 2) The longer

distance, the smaller addition.
Using the example above, an indirect precedence table is shown in Table 3.4.
According to the denition, data dependency can be derived from provenance as
causality relation pairs. For the example above, it is

a ≺d e, a ≺d c, a ≺d b, c ≺d d.

Following is the construction of weight table combining both precedence tables and
data dependency.

Denition 8.
For
and

n

wij

Weight table

tasks, the weight table is a

n×n

is calculated as follows. First,

matrix

W , W = [wij ]

wij = pij + sij ;

second, if

where

i ≺d j

1 ≤ i, j ≤ n
is present in

causality relation pairs derived from provenance as data dependencies, add
where

σ

σ

is the number of workow running.

Using the example above,

σ = 2,

the weight table is shown in Table 3.5.
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to

wij

Table 3.6: Condence table
a

b

c

d

e

a

0

3.8

3.44

1.152

3.512

b

0

0

2

1.6

-0.36

c

0

0

0

4

0

d

0

0

0

0

0.36

e

0

0.36

0

-0.36

0

Table 3.7: Causality table

Denition 9.
For
and

cij

Causality Relation Pair

Weight

a≺b
b≺c
c≺d
d≺e
a≺e
e≺b
a≺c
a≺d
b≺d
e≺d

3.8
2
4
0.36
3.512
0.36
3.44
1.152
1.6
-0.36

Condence table

n tasks, the condence table is a n×n matrix C , C = [cij ] where 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n
is calculated as follows:

cij = wij − wji .

Using the example above, the condence table is shown in Table 3.6.
The causality table is shown in Table 3.7. For each pair
dependency

t1 ≺d t2 ,

then it is control dependency

t1 ≺ t2 ,

if it is not data

t1 ≺c t2 .

Rules are designed as below to update causality table:

1. For tasks

tk , tm

and its causality

tk ≺ tm ,

it.
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if its weight is lower than 1, remove

a

b

c

e

d

Figure 3.14: A resulting Petri net (all causality pairs are included, and an AND-split
is used for task a)

2. For tasks

tk , tm

and its causality

tk ≺ tm ,

if there is

each pair has higher condence than the one of

tk ≺ ... ≺ tm ,

tk ≺ tm ,

remove

in which

tk ≺ tm

from

causality table.

Firstly, for each valid causality, there are many chances to get higher than 1, such
as direct precedence, data dependency, or indirect precedence (e.g.

1.0496 > 1).

Secondly, For tk

0.82 + 0.84 =

≺ ... ≺ tm , it is highly possible that tk ≺ tm

get higher

than 1 for multiple indirect precedences, but actually there is no direct causality
between

tk

and

tm .

Using the steps and rules above for the example, valid causality pairs are derived:

a ≺ b, b ≺ c, c ≺ d, a ≺ e, a ≺ c, a Petri net can be constructed as Figure 3.14, which
matches exactly the original workow.
The construction of a causality table is summarized in Algorithm 3.1.

3.2.5 Generating a Petri Net from a Causality Table
It is straightforward to derive a causality graph from a causality table, but it requires
additional information to generate a Petri net from a causality table, including
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Algorithm 3.1 Construction of a Causality Table
Input: Provenance for σ running of a workow that contains n tasks
Output: A causality table T
1: for all workow running instances Run do
2:
for all (ti , tj ) ti directly precedes tj do
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:
13:
14:
15:
16:
17:
18:
19:
20:
21:
22:
23:
24:
25:
26:
27:
28:
29:
30:
31:

pij ++

end for
for all (ti , tj ) ti indirectly precedes tj do
Assume the sequence as

ti , tk , ..., tm , tj

δ = 0.8
sij += δ m−k+1

end for
end for
for i = 1 to n do
for j = 1 to n do
wij = pij + sij
if ∃d1 , d2 , d3 ∈ Data  (d1 , ti , d2 ) ∈ Run ∧ (d2 , tj , d3 ) ∈ Run
wij +=σ

then

end if
end for
end for
for i = 1 to n do
for j = 1 to n do

cij = wij − wji
if cij ≥ 1 then
T = T ∪ {(ti ≺ tj , cij )}

end if
end for
end for
for all (ti ≺ tj , cij ) ∈ T do
if ∃tk ≺ ... ≺ tm  (ti ≺ tk ) ∧ (tm ≺ tj ) ∧ (cik > cij ) ∧ (...) ∧ (cmj > cij ) then
T = T \{(ti ≺ tj , cij )}

end if
end for
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parallelism and choice of tasks. In Petri nets, parallelism can be represented with
a AND-split, and choice can be represented with a OR-split. For instance, if there
are causality pairs

ti ≺ tj

and

ti ≺ tk ,

the type of a split from

ti

to

tj

AND/OR

tk

has to be detected, to generate a Petri net. The principle of detection is to employ
the weight table above to check the pattern of

tj

and

tk :

1)

wjk = 0

and

wkj = 0,

that shows the pattern

tj tk

or

tk tj

cannot appear, it is an OR-split; 2) Otherwise,

that shows the pattern

tj tk

or

tk tj

can appear, it is an AND-split. The algorithm

to detect the type of a split is given in Algorithm 3.2. It is assumed that a OR-split
is placed after an AND-split, i.e. it is conjunctions of clauses, and each clause is a
disjunction of tasks.

Algorithm 3.2 Detection of the type of the splits
Input: Weight table w, task t0 and tasks t1 , ...ti , ..., tn in which t0 ≺ ti (1 ≤ i ≤ n)
is a causality pair

Output:

A set of clauses

Disj

in which each is a set of tasks that are in the OR-

relation

1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:
13:
14:
15:
16:
17:
18:

A set of tasks Conj in which each is in the AND-relation
0
Derive W from W with the rows and columns related with t1 , ...ti , ..., tn
0
0
Let W = [wij ]; Disj = ∅; Conj = ∅

n empty sets: Seti where 1 ≤ i ≤ n
for i = 1 to n do
for j = 01 to n do0
if wij =0 & wji =0 & i 6= j then
Seti = Seti ∪ {i, j}
Setj = Setj ∪ {i, j}

Create

end if
end for
end for
for i = 1 to n do
if Seti is empty then

Conj = Conj ∪ {ti }

else

Disj = Disj ∪ {< Seti >}

end if
end for
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3.2.6 Providing Recommendation for Scientic Workow Composition
Given a partial workow, based on a set of causality tables and a set of Petri nets,
this section provides a method to recommend a next most likely task and related
part of a Petri net.
A

causality path

is a sequence of tasks t1 , ..., ti , ...tn in which ti

are causality pairs. The length of causality path is
For the current task

t0

≺ ti+1 (1 ≤ i < n)

n.

selected in the partial workow, a set of possible next

tasks can be easily found by looking up the set of causality tables as {pi
and

1 ≤ i ≤ m},

where

m

is the number of tasks found.

| t0 ≺ pi

A method is given in

Algorithm 3.3 to provide recommendation. Firstly, the method gives an indicator
on each causality table how it matches the given partial workow.

Secondly, for

each possible next task, the method gets a recommendation rate by two factors: the
weight of the corresponding causality pairs and the indicator of match level. Finally,
the method gives recommendation condence

Confi

for each possible next task:

ratei
Confi = Pm
j=1 ratej
where

ratei

is the recommendation rate for each possible next task.

3.3 Evaluation
The method described in this chapter is evaluated using a Java program for the
accuracy of recommendation. The provenance being used in this section are generated with a real scientic workow from the open scientic workow repository
myExperiment, that is the challenge workow from the third Provenance Challenge
(http://www.myexperiment.org/workows/750).
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Algorithm 3.3 Providing Recommendation
Input: A causality path that end at current

task

t0

in the partial workow

tn , ..., ti , ...t0 ;
a set of causality tables {Tj

Output:
1:

2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:
13:
14:
15:
16:
17:
18:
19:
20:

|1≤j≤k

}

A set of possible next tasks with recommendation rates

Let the set of possible next tasks be

| t0 ≺ pi and 1 ≤ i ≤ m}
for j = 1 to k do
matchj = 1
for i = 1 to n do
if ∃ (tx ≺ ty , wxy ) ∈ Tj 
tx = ti−1 ∧ ty = ti then
matchj ++
{ pi

end if
end for
end for
for i = 1 to m do

ratei = 0
for j = 1 to k do
if ∃ (t0 ≺ pi , wi ) ∈ Tj then
ratei +=wi × matchj

end if
end for
end for
for i = 1 to m do
end for

ratei
R = R ∪ {(pi , Pm
)}
j=0 ratej
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R

To evaluate the accuracy of recommendation, the method is applied to each task
of workows. For each task ti , there are

n dependent tasks, and there are p possible

next tasks with recommendation condence.

n

tasks are picked up from the set of

possible next tasks with highest condence if available, in which there are
matched with one of
is also

m

hits out of

n

p

dependent tasks, that is

m

hits out of

n

m

tasks

real ones. And, it

recommendations. The accuracy of recommendation for each

task is dened as:

accuracyi =

m2
n×p

.
Figure 3.15 compares the method described in this chapter to the methods using
only control dependency or only data dependency for recommendation.

The

α

algorithm only mine control dependency while most recommendation algorithms
uses only data dependency, this chapter combines both control dependency and
data dependency to improve the recommendation accuracy. As shown in Figure 3.15,
our method performs better than the method that mines only control dependency,
because the data dependency is utilized in the algorithm to assist mining control
dependency; and our method performs better than the method that uses only data
dependency except in a task, because for some tasks that has only data dependency,
our method may give false control dependency, thus lower down the accuracy.

3.4 Related Works
The

α

algorithm [44] assumes completeness of event logs, this chapter proposes an

algorithm based on the

α

algorithm to use data dependency improving the mining

result. There are also a number of process mining algorithms implemented to mine
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Figure 3.15: Comparison of Recommendation Accuracy for Dierent Methods

incomplete events logs, such as fuzzy miner, heuristic miner. The fuzzy miner [35] assumes that problems in mining large scale processes are caused by mismatch between
fundamental assumptions of traditional process mining, and the characteristics of
real-life processes. Fuzzy miner developed an adaptive simplication and visualization technique for process models, which is based on two metrics, signicance and
correlation. The two metrics are similar to the concept of data clustering domain
where a binary distance metric is inferred to nd related subsets of attributes. In
the context of scientic workows, signicance, which can be determined both for
tasks and precedence relations over them, measures the relative importance of behavior. As such, it species the level of interest we have in tasks and their control
dependency. Correlation is only relevant for precedence relations over tasks, which
measures how closely related two events following one another are. The heuristics
miner is a practical applicable mining algorithm that can deal with noise, and can
be used to express the main behavior (i.e. not all details and exceptions) registered
in an event log [36]. It includes three steps: (1) the construction of the dependency
graph, (2) for each activity, the construction of the input and output expressions
and (3) the search for long distance dependency relations. All those miners do not
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utilize data dependency, the algorithm of this chapter can be applied to any of them
enhancing the mining result.
This chapter is related to workow recommendation papers based on provenance.
Besides the dierence in recommendation technique with other papers, this chapter has a unique advantage that it can build a whole workow model for general
reference. The work in [37], based on large scale databases of workow execution
traces, proposes exploiting these databases with a  knowledge light approach to
reuse, applying case based reasoning (CBR) methods to those traces to support scientists' workow generation process in two phases. The rst phase is retrieving from
a database the entries for all workows containing any one of the current tasks, the
second phase is similarity assessment based on the ranking by the size of the largest
mapping produced between current tasks and retrieved cases. This chapter uses a
dierent approach to do recommendation for workow generation, which has two
advantages compared with [37]: this chapter does not use expensive graph matching
algorithms, thus is more ecient; and this chapter can make recommendation on
both data dependency and control dependency while [37] only considers data dependency in their analysis. [45] makes recommendation based on the path in partial
workow, instead of last node in partial workow.

Provenance are synthetically

generated from a set of nodes, as a set of node sequences. If there is a path, that
has 5 possible following nodes, each of 5 nodes then has 20% condence, it would be
dicult to determine the threshold. [46] proposes a framework for service oriented
scientic workow reuse, its recommendation is based on searching a collection of
workows with the help of annotation. They rst collect scientic workows from
centralized repositories such as myExperiment, then integrates annotations generated from various heterogeneous data sources such as author annotations at dierent
levels (for example, workow, service, or data channels), user comments at runtime,

77

best practices, and statistical data of existing scientic workows and services, including popularity and usage patterns. They also support manual annotation. With
the collected workows and integrated annotations, they uses Apache Lucene, an
open source search engine, to index the information in collection and associated
annotations. Their method can provide relevant information, but cannot suggest a
condence level of each recommendation.
There is also a related work in data mining area that focuses on pairwise temporal
patterns [47]. They state the problem of mining event relationships as: given event
sequence, nding all pairwise statistically dependent patterns that can be characterized as temporal patterns, that assert dependency between events and specify the
timing information, such as  event a happens after event b, say, about 5 minutes .
Their result is in fact the precedence table in this chapter. Since this chapter focuses
on scientic workow area, provenance provides workow running identier for each
event so that it is obvious to get the precedence table, which is the pairwise event
dependency in [47]. Combined with algorithms in [47], this chapter can be applied
to unstructured data, or semi-structured data, such as computer system log les.

3.5 Summary
This chapter presents a method based on provenance to mine models for scientic
workows, including data and control dependency.

The mining result can either

suggest part of others' workows for consideration, or make familiar part of workow easily accessible, thus provide recommendation support for scientic workows
composition, which oers a new approach to build workows in the context of scientic workows. Given the fact that provenance captured in any scientic workow
based systems or system level monitoring systems contains information about tasks

78

and their temporal order, the proposed algorithm can give both control and data dependency for recommendation during scientic workows composition. The method
provided in this chapter can be applied to any scientic workow management systems.
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CHAPTER 4

MCPATOM: A PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS TOOL FOR ATOMICITY
VIOLATION USING MODEL CHECKING

4.1 Overview
Multi-core hardware is a growing industry trend, for both high performance servers
and low power mobile devices. Multi-thread programs can exploit multi-core processors at their full potential. In the real world, most servers and high-end critical
software are multi-threaded.

Unfortunately, multi-thread programs are prone to

bugs due to the inherent complexity caused by concurrency. It is dicult to detect
concurrency bugs due to the huge number of possible interleavings. Many concurrency bugs escape from testing into software releases and cause some of the most
serious computer-related accidents in history, including a blackout leaving tens of
millions of people without electricity [9].
Among dierent types of concurrency bugs, atomicity violation bugs are the most
common one.

Atomicity violation bugs are caused by violations to the atomicity

of certain code regions without proper synchronization.

They widely exist in the

real world systems and contributed to about 70% of the examined non-deadlock
concurrency bugs [10]. Therefore, techniques for detecting atomicity violation bugs
are extremely important.
This chapter presents a dynamic prediction tool McPatom to predict atomicity
violation bugs involving a pair of threads accessing a shared variable using model
checking, based on binary executables that use POSIX thread library. McPatom uses
memory access patterns instead of subroutine atomicity. The only input needed by
McPatom is a binary executable, while source code is optional for locating bugs.
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Figure 4.1: Overview of McPatom Framework to predict atomicity violation bugs
using model checking

The McPatom framework contains the following major steps: (1) using Pin [48]
to instrument an interleaved execution of a multi-thread program and to record an
interleaved trace containing only atomicity violation impacting events including all
shared variable accesses and all synchronization routines (locks, condition variables,
barriers and thread management events); (2) projecting the interleaved trace into a
partial order thread model of abstract threads, which maintains the causal relation
within actual threads imposed by the synchronization routines; (3) automatically
translating the partial order thread model into a Promela program for model checking in Spin [19]; (4) dening a complete set of atomicity violation patterns involving
a pair of threads accessing every single shared variable and automatically translating them into temporal logic formulas; (5) using Spin to model check the atomicity
violation patterns; and (6) mapping the violation reported in Spin to the execution
trace in the original multi-thread program. Figure 4.1 gives an overview of McPatom
framework.
Our work makes the following contributions:

1. A method to extract a thread model from an instrumented interleaved trace
that only records events related to atomicity violations. Such an interleaved
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trace is much smaller than the program behavior in a complete execution. Furthermore the extracted thread model enables the checking of all alternative
traces with the same causal relationships as the interleaved trace. The completeness of instrumented interleaved traces and the extracted thread models
is proved.
2. A complete set of the patterns of unserializable interleavings involving two
threads (most concurrency bugs involve only two threads [11]) containing any
number of accesses to a shared variable (either user dened or every word sized
dynamically allocated memory accessed by multiple threads). These patterns
generalize and cover the three accesses proposed in [10][12]. These atomicity
violation patterns become property specications to be checked.
3. A unique prediction tool - McPatom, for detecting atomicity violation bugs
through model checking.

McPatom instruments interleaved executions, ex-

tracts thread models from interleaved traces, automatically converts (1) thread
models into Promela programs and (2) atomicity violation patterns into property specications.

By constraining the checking within a pair of threads

involving one shared variable at a time, the interleaving space to be checked is
vastly reduced. As a result, McPatom is applicable to large software systems.
McPatom can predict atomicity violations that do not manifest during testing
or runtime.

We applied McPatom to predict several known atomicity violations in real world
systems as well as an atomicity violation that cannot be detected by several existing
tools. We obtained favorable experimental results with regard to atomicity violation
predictability, accuracy and performance of using McPatom.
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4.2 Extracting Partial Order Thread Models from Multi-thread
Program Executions
4.2.1 Description of the Partial Order Thread Model
A multi-thread program has a set of threads and a set of shared variables. Shared
variables are addresses of global variables and every word sized dynamically allocated memory accessed by multiple threads. The same memory address is considered
as another shared variable if it is released and reallocated through the invocations
of memory functions. An execution

σ = s1 , ..., sn

of a multi-thread program

P

is a

sequence of executed statements. A trace is the projection of an execution to a sequence of annotated shared variable accesses and synchronization events. Formally,
a trace,
a tuple

τ = e1 , ..., em

is a sequence of events where each event

htidi , timestampi , actioni i

in which

a time stamp based on real time and

tidi

actioni

ei (1 ≤ i ≤ m)

is

timestampi

is

is a thread handle,

is one of the following: (read/write,

a shared variable), (a synchronization routine, a synchronization variable) or (a
thread management operation, a thread handle). McPatom uses POSIX Threads
in which a synchronization routine is a routine related to semaphores, mutex locks,
condition variables and barriers, does not handle user-dened synchronization primitives. McPatom also assumes a shared variable as a synchronization variable if it
is accessed by synchronization routines, thus does not treat its accesses as shared
variable accesses.

Lemma 4. A trace τ = e1 , ..., em extracted from an execution sequence σ = s1 , ..., sn
is sound and complete with respect to σ in terms of atomicity violation predictability.
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Proof.

(1) Soundness: An atomicity violation revealed in

obvious since
exists in

τ

is a projection of

σ.

τ

must exist in

σ.

This is

An atomicity violation pattern appearing in

τ

σ.

(2) Completeness: Any existing atomicity violation in

σ

remains in

τ.

Since

atomicity violations do not depend on general program states, and only depend on
the execution orders of shared variable accesses and synchronization events, that are
completely captured in

Denition 10

τ.

.

(Partial Order Thread Model)

Given a trace

τ = e1 , ..., em

con-

taining shared variable accesses and synchronization events, a partial order thread
model

(Eτ , ≺)

is dened as follows:

1.

Eτ = {ei | ei in τ }

2.

≺

is a partial order relation such that, for any

(a)

tidi = tidj

(b)

tidi 6= tidj , actioni = (Signal, cvar), actionj = (W ait, cvar)

and

i < j,

ei , ej ∈ E (i 6= j), ei ≺ ej

i

or

((j < k < i) ∧ (actionk 6= (Signal, cvar))

in which

cvar

and

∀k 

is a condition

variable, or
(c)

tidi 6= tidj , actioni = (W ait, bvar) and (i < j) ∧ ∃k  ((tidk = tidj ) ∧ (k <
j) ∧ actionk = (W ait, bvar) ∧ ∀h  ((tidh = tidk ) ⇒ ¬(k < h < j)))
which

bvar

is a barrier variable, or

(d)

tidi 6= tidj , actioni = (Create, tidj ),

(e)

tidi 6= tidj , actionj = (Join, tidi ).

3. Mutual exclusion: for any

en ≺ ei

in

or

ei , ej , em , en ∈ E (i 6= j 6= m 6= n), ej ≺ em

i
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or

(a)

tidi = tidj , actioni = (Lock, lvar), actionj = (U nlock, lvar),

(b)

tidm = tidn , actionm = (Lock, lvar), actionn = (U nlock, lvar).

and

The above partial order relation (or simply causal relation) is similar to the
happened-before relation given in [49].

From the above denition, we have (1)

shared variable accesses within the same thread are ordered, and (2) a pair of shared
variable accesses from two dierent threads are only ordered if and only if they are
constrained by some intermediate synchronization events such as one thread creating
the other.
While the partial order thread model

τ,

(Eτ , ≺) respects the causal relation in trace

it captures an equivalent class of alternative traces that obey the same causal re-

lation as

τ,

in which each alternative trace

variable accesses not constrained by

≺.

τ0

is a result of rearranging some shared

The partial order thread model allows us to

explore all possible alternative traces that correspond to a set of feasible interleavings in a multi-thread program, however, the model provides an over-approximation
without considering data-ow, thus cannot guarantee each permissible trace in the
model is covered by some feasible interleaved execution in the multi-thread program

P.

4.2.2 Implementation of the Partial Order Thread Model
4.2.2.1 Capturing runtime traces and related source code
McPatom uses Pin binary instrumentation framework [48] to collect runtime trace
information, specically including, every access to every shared variable and every synchronization event using POSIX Thread (locks, condition variables, barriers,
thread joining and etc.). For each collected event, McPatom also nds the corresponding source code information including le name and line number. The source
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3047143104 ,
3047143104 ,
3020999536 ,
3020999536 ,
3020999536 ,
3020999536 ,
3020999536 ,

1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,

thread .c -624 ,
thread .c -172 ,
thread .c -240 ,
thread .c -241 ,
thread .c -241 ,
thread .c -242 ,
thread .c -243 ,

Read , threads
Create , 3020999536
Lock , init_lock
Read , init_count
Write , init_count
Signal , init_cond
Unlock , init_lock

Figure 4.2: A Sample of a Partial Trace (The format of each line: thread handle,
timestamp, le name - line number, action)

code information can be used to help locating the predicted bugs. A sample of a
partial trace is shown in Figure 4.2.

4.2.2.2 Automatically encoding traces to Promela code
McPatom uses Spin model checker to detect atomicity violations in a partial order
thread model. This section shows how we realize a partial order thread model from
a recorded trace in Spin's underlying language Promela.

Dening Shared Variable Accesses
short

as a

McPatom denes every shared variable

in Promela, automatically assigns a unique value for all reading accesses

and a unique value for all writing accesses in each thread. Formally, let
and

tid

be thread ID, each access of

v

is dened as

v=rw+tid.

rw ∈ {r, w}

Since the maximum

number of threads per process is limited to 64 in POSIX threads, McPatom sets
to

v

0, and w

to 64. For example, given two threads:

shared variable

1.

v=

1

2.

v=1

3.

v=

4.

v=2

64+

v,

2

and

McPatom makes the following assignments :

for each writing access of

for each reading access of

64+

t1(tid=1)

v

v

in thread

in thread

for each writing access of

for each reading access of

v

v
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t1,

in thread

in thread

t1,

t2.

t 2,

r

t2(tid=2), and a

# define NUM_LOCKS 100
short locked [ NUM_LOCKS ] = -1;
inline Lock ( l) {
if
:: atomic {( locked [l ] == -1) -> locked [ l] = _pid }
fi ;
}
inline Unlock (l ) {
assert ( locked [ l] == _pid ) ;
locked [l ] = -1;
}
Figure 4.3: Promela Code Modeling Mutex Locks

Dening Synchronization Primitives

McPatom automatically generates Promela

code for all synchronization primitives. Due to space limit, we only present Promela
code for mutex locks. McPatom models synchronization events to capture the causal
relationships between threads, to prune infeasible interleavings. The Promela code
shown in Figure 4.3 models the POSIX Thread routines

pthread_mutex_unlock.

pthread_mutex_lock

The atomic construct groups indivisible statements to-

gether to ensure no interleaving within an atomic sequence.
accepts a lock

l

and

as its argument. If lock

l

is not locked,

Lock

sets the owner to the thread that is the predened variable
process in Promela. If lock

l

thread is blocked until lock

Lock

inline function

function locks it and

_pid

for the executing

is in locked status, no guards are executable so that the

l

is available according to Promela semantics.

inline function simply sets lock

l

Unlock

to unlocked status. It is exactly what is required

to model locking and unlocking of a mutex lock.

Dening Threads

All events with regard to a particular thread from the recorded

trace are grouped into a Promela process in which each event is represented by its
corresponding Promela code dened in previous steps as shown in Figure 4.4. Since
the maximum number of threads per process in POSIX threads is 64, which is well
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proctype t1 () { ... }
proctype t2 ()
{
Lock ( init_lock ) ;
/* thread .c - 240 */
init_count = 0 + 2;
/* thread .c - 241 */
init_count = 64 + 2;
/* thread . c - 241 */
Signal ( init_cond ) ;
/* thread .c - 242 */
Unlock ( init_lock ) ;
/* thread .c - 243 */
...
}
init
{
run t2 () ;
/* thread .c - 172 */
...
}
Figure 4.4: A Sample of Partial Promela Code

below the maximum number (256) of processes allowed in Promela, we do not have a
problem to encode all possible threads occurring in a recorded trace. The interleaved
execution of processes in the Promela program generates all alternative permissible
traces in the partial order thread model.

4.3 Dening and Encoding Unserializable Interleaving Patterns between Two Threads
Atomicity is a semantic correctness property for concurrent programs.

A thread

interleaving is serializable if and only if it is equivalent to a serial execution, which
executes a code region without other threads interleaved in between. The code region
is typically enforced as atomic explicitly in the code. When proper synchronization
is missing to enforce atomicity, atomicity violation bugs may occur. [50] proved that
a thread interleaving is serializable if and only if its conict graph is acyclic.
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Most concurrency bugs involve two threads, instead of a large number of threads,
based on the study in [11], in which 101 out of 105 bugs involved only two threads.
Thus atomicity violation bugs in a multi-thread program can be explored through
every pair of threads. Our work is inspired by the works in [10][12], which addressed
a special case of unserializable interleavings with three accesses of the same shared
variable.

However, as Figure 4.5 shows, there are real world bugs involving four

accesses of the same shared variable.

Furthermore, there can be more accesses

involved, such as reading accesses of a shared variable for logging purpose.

The

patterns given in this chapter cover atomicity violation bugs involving any number
of accesses of a shared variable between a pair of threads.

4.3.1 Three-access and Four-access Atomicity Violation
Many recent works focused on three-access atomicity violations [10][12][11], which
involve one shared variable, two threads and three accesses to the variable. For simplicity, two threads are referred as a local thread (Thread 1) and a remote thread
(Thread 2), the opposite view is also explored during the detection process. If two
consecutive accesses of a shared variable in a local thread are interleaved with an
access to the variable from a remote thread, the interleaving is a potential unserializable one. In practice, unserializable interleavings indicate the presence of atomicity
violation bugs. The explanation of unserializable interleavings of three accesses and
many real world atomicity violation bugs can be found in [10].
Three-access atomicity violations are chosen by tools above because (1) there
are many real world atomicity violation bugs involving only three accesses, and
(2) checking only two accesses (current access and previous access) in a thread
can reduce the complexity of algorithms. However, some atomicity violation bugs
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Figure 4.5: A four-access atomicity violation bug [51] in Mozilla (Incorrect interleaving 1 was detected by PSet [51] and missed by AVIO [10], while incorrect interleaving
2 cannot be detected by either PSet or AVIO.)

involve more than three accesses. A real world example [51] is shown in Figure 4.5.
The shared variable accesses in Thread 1 must be in an atomic region; otherwise,
a possible interleaving may result in HandleEvent function of Thread 2 returning
with a missing event.

PSet [51] detected this bug (incorrect interleaving 1) since

PSet keeps track of either the last writer or the set of last readers for every memory
location. However PSet cannot detect the mutant of the bug (incorrect interleaving
2) because in PSet's view the mutant only involves a set of last readers and the
current reading access. AVIO [10] cannot detect this bug because it involves more
than three accesses.

4.3.2 Patterns of Two-thread Atomicity Violations involving
Any Number of Accesses
In the sequel, a two-thread atomicity violation refers to a two-thread atomicity violation involving any number of accesses of a shared variable, and
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A ∈ {Read, W rite},

Figure 4.6:

Unserializable Interleavings with two threads.

In (1)(2)(3)(5), W in

Thread 2 unexpectedly changes the value; In (4), An intermediate value in Thread
1 is read by Thread 2.

R = Read, W = W rite, A∗
denotes zero or more

R

denotes zero or more

and

R+

A, A+

denotes one or more

R.

denotes one or more

A, R ∗

This section gives a set of

patterns covering all possible two-thread atomicity violations.
Figure 4.6 shows all possible scenarios of unserializable interleavings with only
one access from Thread 2.

If any of the unserializable interleaving patterns is

matched, it indicates a potential atomicity violation.

Theorem 2 (Completeness of the set of Patterns in Figure 4.6). The set of patterns
in Figure 4.6 is complete, i.e. they cover all possible unserializable interleavings
between two threads.
Proof.

Let

At11 , At22 , ..., Atnn

be a sequence of atomic accesses in an interleaved exe-

cution of two threads, in which

Atii (ti ∈ {1, 2}, Atii ∈ {Read, W rite}, 1 ≤ i ≤ n)

denotes an atomic access from thread ti to the same shared variable. Let every subsequence of

At11 , At22 , ..., Atnn

be of the form

B11 , B22 , B31

91

where

B11

and

B31

of Thread 1

are sequences of

i B22

pattern .

Atii (ti = 1), B22

Atii (ti = 2).

Let

Pi

be

is assumed to be or can be reduced without losing writing operations

to a single access
Figure 4.6,

of Thread 2 is a sequence of

A22 .

B11 , A22 , B31

If

B11 , A22 , B31

satises

does not match with any of the patterns in

¬P1 ∧ ¬P2 ∧ ¬P3 ∧ ¬P4 ∧ ¬P5 .

Since operator

∧

is

commutative, we can select a specic order and carry out an incremental analysis
of possible

1.

2.

3.

B11 , A22 , B31

B11 , A22 , B31

based on each of

satises

Pi (1 ≤ i ≤ 5).

¬P1 . B11 , A22 , B31

can only be one of the following:

(a)

B11 = A∗ W A∗ , A22 = W , B31 = A+

(b)

B11 = A+ , A22 = W , B31 = A∗ W A∗

(c)

B11 = A+ , A22 = R, B31 = A+

B11 , A22 , B31

satises

¬P1 ∧ ¬P2 . B11 , A22 , B31

can only be one of the following:

(a)

B11 = A∗ W A∗ , A22 = W , B31 = A∗ W A∗

(b)

B11 = A+ , A22 = W , B31 = A∗ W A∗

(c)

B11 = A+ , A22 = R, B31 = A+

B11 , A22 , B31

satises

¬P1 ∧ ¬P2 ∧ ¬P3 . B11 , A22 , B31

can only be one of the fol-

lowing:

4.

(a)

B11 = A∗ W A∗ , A22 = W , B31 = A∗ W A∗

(b)

B11 = A∗ W A∗ , A22 = W , B3 = A∗ W A∗

(c)

B11 = A+ , A22 = R, B31 = A+

B11 , A22 , B31

satises

which is equivalent to above one.

¬P1 ∧ ¬P2 ∧ ¬P3 ∧ ¬P4 . B11 , A22 , B31

following:
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can only be one of the

5.

(a)

B11 = A∗ W A∗ , A22 = W , B31 = A∗ W A∗

(b)

B11 = R+ , A22 = R, B31 = A+

(c)

B11 = A+ , A22 = R, B31 = R+

B11 , A22 , B31

satises

¬P1 ∧ ¬P2 ∧ ¬P3 ∧ ¬P4 ∧ ¬P5 . B11 , A22 , B31

can only be one

of the following:

(a)

B11 = R+ , A22 = R, B31 = A+

(b)

B11 = A+ , A22 = R, B31 = R+

According to the Serializability Theorem [50], an interleaved sequence is serializable
if and only if its conict graph is acyclic. Either 5(a)
or 5(b)

B11 = A+ , A22 = R, B31 = R+

B11 = R+ , A22 = R, B31 = A+

is serializable. Therefore, the completeness of

the set of patterns in Figure 4.6 is proved.

4.3.3 Automatically encoding atomicity violation patterns into
Linear time Temporal Logic (LTL) Formulas
For every shared variable and every pair of threads

t1

and

t2,

McPatom automat-

ically denes a LTL formula (4.1) for each pattern in Figure 4.6 and another LTL
formula (4.2) reversing the view of

t1

and

t2 .
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Let

v

be a shared variable,

r

= 0 and

w

= 64 as dened in section 4.2.2.2,

Ai ∈ {r, w},

and

tidi , tidi ∈ {1, 2}.

[]! <> ((v == A1 + tid1 )&&
X((v == A2 + tid2 )U ((v == A3 + tid3 )&&

(4.1)

X((v == A4 + tid4 )U (v == A5 + tid5 )))))
[]! <> ((v == A1 + tid1 )&&
X((v == A2 + tid2 )U ((v == A3 + tid3 )&&

(4.2)

X((v == A4 + tid4 )U (v == A5 + tid5 )))))
where  [] denotes

tually,

X denotes

Always,

Next

!

denotes

and U denotes

Logical Negation,
Until.

<> denotes

Even-

These formulas specify that the

atomicity violation patterns do not occur.
Using Figure 4.6 (2) as a concrete example, one formula in LTL is shown below:

[]! <> ((v == w + 1)&&
X((v == r + 1)U ((v == w + 2)&&

(4.3)

X((v == w + 2)U (v == r + 1)))))
(v == w + 2)U (v == r + 1) is
is true or simply
captures
2,

R1+

W2∗ R1+

v == r + 1
in which

W2∗

true if and only if
holds without

v == w + 2 holds until v == r + 1

v == w + 2

holds.

means zero or more writing accesses from Thread

means one or more reading accesses from Thread 1.

w +2)&&X((v == w +2)U (v == r +1)) captures W2+ R1+
w + 2)&&X((v == w + 2)U (v == r + 1)))
captures

[]! <> W1 R1∗ W2+ R1+

This subformula

reects

and ensures that pattern

and

Furthermore,

(v ==

(v == r +1)U ((v ==

R1∗ W2+ R1+ .

Therefore, (4.3)

W1 R1∗ W2 R1+

in Figure 4.6 (2)

does not occur in the partial order thread model. The reason that the LTL formula
contains
and

R1+ ,

W2+

instead of

W2

is that there can be synchronization events between

for each of those events,

W2

needs to hold.
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W2

4.4 Predictive Analysis of Atomicity Violation using Model
Checking
In this section, we discuss McPatom framework's general merits in terms of its
soundness and completeness as well as specic ways in using Spin model checker
[19] to show its applicability.

4.4.1 Soundness and completeness of McPatom
An important feature of a prediction method is its capability to predict as many
violations as possible. Since the majority of existing prediction methods uses an abstract model extracted from one interleaved execution at a time from a multi-thread
program, a prediction method's capability rests on the quality of the abstract model
built and its thoroughness in exploring the permissible traces in the abstract model.
McPatom extracts the least constrained partial order thread model respecting the
causal relation from the observed interleaved execution and uses model checking to
explore all permissible traces in the partial order thread model.

Theorem 3. McPatom ensures the completeness of its prediction - any possible
atomicity violation involving a pair of threads accessing one shared variable in the
partial order thread model can be detected.
Proof.

McPatom encodes all possible atomicity violation patterns involving a pair

of threads accessing one shared variable (Theorem 2) into linear time temporal
logic formulas. McPatom uses model checking to exhaustively check whether any
temporal logic formula fails in the partial order thread model. Thus none of possible
atomicity violation will be undetected.
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In general, McPatom cannot guarantee the soundness of its prediction, i.e., each
predicted atomicity violation is covered by a feasible execution, since data-ow is
ignored in the partial order thread model.
One major potential problem using model checking is the state explosion problem. Fortunately, the state explosion problem will not occur in atomicity violation
prediction due to the following reasons (1) the partial order thread model (capturing only shared variable accesses and synchronization events) used for model
checking is drastically smaller compared to the original multi-thread program, (2)
each atomicity violation pattern to be checked involves only one shared variable,
and (3) checking each atomicity violation pattern does not depend on the value of
the shared variable. Another possible problem with model checking is the potential
exponential number of possible interleavings due to the number of threads involved
and the number of shared variable accesses. This problem is partially resolved (1)
due to our focus on checking atomicity violations involving only two threads, (2) due
to the constraints imposed by causal relations that drastically reduce the number of
potential interleavings generated by the number of shared variable accesses, and (3)
due to our implementation strategies of grouping all reading event sequences in each
thread into atomic blocks in Spin to achieve partial order reductions and enforcing
the wait/signal order of condition variables in the observed execution while exploring alternative interleavings. Our experiment results show very good performance
using model checking.
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70: proc 2 ( t13 ) spin_av . pml :551 ( state 28) [ sharedvariable
= (0+13) ]
72: proc 3 ( t48 ) spin_av . pml :591 ( state 31) [ sharedvariable
= (64+48) ]
76: proc 2 ( t13 ) spin_av . pml :552 ( state 29) [ sharedvariable
= (0+13) ]
Figure 4.7: A Sample of Atomicity Violation Trace Reported by Spin

4.4.2 Using Spin model checker to nd atomicity violation
traces
McPatom selects Spin model checker [19] based on its maturity, popularity, and capability. Spin is used to check every atomicity violation freedom property involving
every pair of threads accessing every single shared variable one at a time in the partial order thread model extracted from a single interleaved trace recorded through
instrumentation using Pin.

Based on the partial order thread model encoded in

Promela in section 4.2.2.2, and the atomicity violation freedom property encoded in
LTL formulas in section 4.3.3, McPatom uses Spin to nd atomicity violation traces
or report no atomicity violations. Figure 4.7 gives an example of atomicity violation
reported by Spin, which is mapped to real code in the original program.
Spin can be congured to search all errors or stop at the rst error. McPatom
chooses to stop at the rst error, thus McPatom reports no atomicity violation if
there exists no atomicity violation; when McPatom reports some atomicity violation
traces, there may be additional atomicity violations not yet reported, which can be
detected by re-running McPatom after grouping the previously reported violation
related accesses into an atomic region so that it will not cause a new violation in the
next run. For each shared variable and each pair of threads, an atomicity violation
is recorded in a Spin trail le for each pattern if it exists. The Spin trail le can be
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sharedvar =0+13; /* mod_log_config .c -1353*/ | if ( len + buf -> outcnt > LOG_BUFSIZE )
sharedvar =64+48; /* mod_log_config .c -1373*/|
buf -> outcnt += len ;
sharedvar =0+13; /* mod_log_config .c -1369*/ |s = & buf -> outbuf [ buf -> outcnt ]
Figure 4.8: Promela code and the corresponding real code in the original program

Table 4.1: Bug List
Bug #

Program

Issue Number

1

Apache

25520

2

Apache

21287

3

Apache

21285

4

MySQL

644

5

MySQL

791

6

Mozilla-extract

Figure 4.5

simulated by Spin to give a clear view of those accesses involved in the atomicity
violation, as shown in Figure 4.7.

4.4.3 Mapping the violations reported in Spin to the original
program
Atomicity violations reported in Spin, as shown in Figure 4.7 as an example, are
mapped to real code in original program.

McPatom automatically identies the

related lines in Promela les, in which the comments of each line in Promela are
le names and line numbers of the corresponding source code.

Figure 4.8 shows

the Promela code at the left and the corresponding real code at the right, for the
atomicity violation in Figure 4.7.

4.5 Evaluation
We have used several real-world systems with known bugs listed in Table 4.1 (the issue numbers are the IDs in corresponding Bugzilla Databases) ([10],[51]) to examine
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Program

1

t

2

fmm

3

lu

4

radix

5

Apache

Table 4.2: Performance
Number
Time
Trace
of
to
Program Input
Size
Shared
Check
(MB)
Vari(mins)
ables
-p2 -m1024

Number
of Properties

Average
Time per
Property
(secs)

4.3

304

3656

36560

0.499

10.8

183

1248

12480

0.88

-p2 -n16

0.3

0.44

5

50

0.53

-p2 -n10

3.7

328

3094

30940

0.636

9.4

15.68

151

3360

0.005

Particles : 64
Processors : 2

2 concurrent
httperf

Table 4.3: Performance (Continue)
Program
1

t

2

fmm

3

lu

4

radix

5

Apache

The Shared Variable with Maximum Number of Accesses
Number of Accesses

Number of States

Time to Check (secs)

1041

3294

0.04

20064

9996

0.08

282

941

0.02

81

433

0.01

1415

16

less than 0.01
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our tool's bug prediction capability, as well as four programs [10] without atomicity
violations in SPLASH-2 parallel benchmark suite [52] to test the accuracy of our
tool (no false positives are reported).

Bug prediction capability
McPatom has successfully predicted all the known bugs listed in Table 4.1, especially
bug number 6 - an extraction of a real world atomicity violation bug reported in
[51], which evades PSet [51] because this bug involves a set of last readers and the
current reading access, and AVIO [10] because this bug involves more than three
accesses.

Accuracy
We have chosen four programs (also used in [10]) without atomicity violations in
SPLASH-2 parallel benchmark suite [52] to test whether McPatom produces violation predictions, which would certainly be false positives. McPatom passed this test
without reporting any violations.

Performance
Since McPatom framework uses model checking as the underlying atomicity violation prediction method and relies on a third party tool, Spin, to perform the model
checking, it is extremely important to demonstrate the applicability of McPatom.

1

We conducted the experiments
memory.

on a PC with dual core 2.33GHz CPU and 2GB

Performance data are given in Table 4.2 and Table 4.3, where time to

check included automatically running Spin, compiling generated pan.c and model
checking properties for all shared variables. There are ten properties to check for

1 Data

available at http://users.cs.u.edu/~rzeng001/spin12/
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each pair of threads accessing a shared variable based on ve violation patterns
and their mutants. Apache program contains more than two threads and results in
more properties to be checked. Instrumentation overhead was similar to that given
in [10]. Table 4.3 shows the shared variable with maximum number of accesses in
each program. From Table 4.2 and Table 4.3, it shows that the number of states
does not explode when the number of accesses increases since checking the shared
variable with maximum number of accesses took less than 0.01 seconds (not including the time to run Spin and compile generated pan.c) while checking any shared
variable on average took 0.005 seconds. These preliminary experimental results are
very encouraging and demonstrate the scalability of McPatom. These results also
conrm our belief that although the total number of possible interleavings to check
can explode quickly as the number of accesses increase; however, the number of
actual interleavings are drastically smaller due to the constraints imposed by causal
relationships between threads. Other major reasons, which also vastly reduce the
possible interleavings, are that McPatom takes advantage of the nature of atomicity violations and considers only a pair of threads and accesses to a single shared
variable at one time, groups all reading event sequences in each thread into atomic
blocks in Spin to achieve partial order reductions , and enforces the wait/signal
order of condition variables in the observed execution while exploring alternative
interleavings. Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 show that the experiment with Apache has
even better performance than others, due to Apache's heavy use of condition variables. Since atomicity violations involving a single shared variable can be checked
independently from violations involving other shared variables, we can signicantly
reduce the duration (not the cumulative time) of model checking by using multiple
machines.
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4.6 Related Works
There are many recent works on tackling atomicity violations. Some works proposed
techniques to detect atomicity violations on actual program executions through testing [53] or runtime monitoring ([10], [54], and [55]). Other works developed methods
to predict atomicity violations that may evade testing and runtime monitoring. In
this section, we mention some recent works most relevant to ours on dynamically
predicting atomicity violations. Most of these works share the following fundamental process: (1) instruments a multi-thread program
events, (2) extracts a trace
cution

σ

of

P,

τ

P,

to record atomicity relevant

of atomicity relevant events from an interleaved exe-

(3) projects trace

relation dened on

P

τ

into a partial order model

(4) explores various alternative trace

M

τ0

in

based on a causal

M

to predict po-

tential atomicity violations in a possible corresponding interleaved execution

P.

σ0

in

Various methods and their supporting tools dier with regard to the strategies

used in the above process.
How to abstract a partial order model

M

from a trace

τ

is critical. If the model is

too restrictive, many feasible atomicity violations cannot be explored. If the model
is too permissible, the prediction may not be sound, i.e. a predicted atomicity violation may not be a feasible interleaved execution of

P.

Penelope [56] ignores some

causal relationships in building a partial order model and thus requires additional
feasibility checking of a predicted atomicity violation. Fusion [12] abstracts a partial order model called concurrent trace program (CTP) that ignores the causal
relation between dierent threads. Linearized atomicity violation traces in CTP are
symbolically checked with additional order information from source codes to ensure
their feasibility. In [57], a theoretical study was conducted to analyze the complexity of predicting atomicity violations, in which two simplied partial order models
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are considered. The rst one ignores all synchronization and the second one only
considers lock-based synchronization. It shows the tradeos between eciency and
accuracy. jPredictor [58] denes a partial order model based on a concept of sliced
causality and lock-atomicity, which may predict some infeasible violations.

Our

work abstracts a partial order model respecting the causal relationships imposed
by all synchronization constructs, but without considering data-ow, our work also
may produce some infeasible violations.
A variety of techniques have been proposed to explore atomicity violation traces
from an abstract partial order model.

CTrigger [11] and Penelope [56] developed

dierent algorithms to generate potential violation schedules and to prune away
many infeasible ones.

However these algorithms may report infeasible atomicity

violation traces as well as miss feasible ones. jPredictor [58] uses model checking to
exhaustively check a property in the partial order model and is capable to predict
other concurrency bugs in addition to atomicity violations.

Fusion [12] encodes

the partial order model, the source program, and three access atomicity violation
patterns into a logic formula; and uses a satisability modulo theory solver to check
the feasible interleavings for atomicity violations.

Our work converts the partial

order model into a Promela program, denes a complete set of atomicity violation
patterns as temporal logic formulas, and then uses Spin model checker to produce
atomicity violation traces.

4.7 Summary
Concurrency bugs are extremely hard to detect using testing techniques due to huge
interleaving space.

This chapter presents a tool McPatom using model checking

to predict atomicity violation concurrency bugs.
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McPatom is powerful and can

explore a vast interleaving space of a multi-threaded program based on a small set
of instrumented test runs. McPatom is applicable to large real-world systems.
McPatom focuses on atomicity violations involving each single shared variable,
and thus cannot nd atomicity violations involving multiple variables.

Another

limitation is that redundant model checking may be performed if two recorded interleaved traces yield the same partial order thread model.
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CHAPTER 5

METHODS FOR IMPROVING THE COVERAGE AND PRECISION
OF MCPATOM

5.1 Overview
Multi-threaded programs are prone to bugs due to concurrency. Concurrency bugs
are hard to nd and reproduce because of the large number of interleavings. Most
non-deadlock concurrency bugs are atomicity violation bugs due to unprotected
accesses of shared variables by multiple threads.

Existing approaches for detect-

ing atomicity violation are either static or dynamic. Static approaches [59] usually
suers from a large number of false positives due to the complexity of analyzing concurrency and pointer aliasing. Dynamic approaches are either monitor based methods that require atomicity violations to manifest during monitored runs [11][54][55],
or predictive methods that explore atomicity violations in alternative interleavings
from some observed runs [56][12][57][58].
Predictive methods use either (1) under-approximate models ([60][61][58][62]) by
analyzing only interleavings with the same read-after-write relationships as in the
observed executions, which are a subset of all feasible interleavings; or (2) overapproximate models ([63][56][64][65][66]) by exploring not only all feasible interleavings but also infeasible interleavings due to data constraints and ad-hoc synchronization, which may produce false positives. Table 5.1 shows ten interleaving
scenarios of three accesses to a shared variable between two threads that will result
in atomicity violations, among which only ve can be predicted by methods using
under-approximate models while the other ve are missed because some of readafter-write relationships within three accesses are broken. Hence methods based on
under-approximate models have inadequate coverage, and methods based on over-
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Figure 5.1: Comparison with other predictive methods on coverage and precision,
in which each oval stands for the traces that can be generated in the corresponding
method as explained below.
UA - Under-approximate methods [60][61][58][62].
PPA - Post-prediction analysis method in this chapter, e.g. Figure 5.3.
Replay - Methods of rescheduling predicted violation traces, e.g. Figure 5.9(c).
Real code - Real program code, captured in Concurrent Trace Programs [12].
OA - Over-approximate methods [63][56][64][65][66], e.g. Figures 5.2, 5.4, 5.8, and
5.9(b).

approximate models are not precise.

Many predictive methods mentioned above

explored the tradeos between precision and coverage.
This chapter presents two methods for improving the coverage and precision of
atomicity violation predictions: 1) a post-prediction analysis method on relaxing the
under-approximate models to increase coverage while ensuring precision; 2) a followup replaying method to further increase coverage.

The post-prediction analysis

method is lightweight and fast, and makes the precise predictions and achieves
better coverage than other existing methods using under-approximate models.
comparison with other methods is given in Figure 5.1.
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A

Table 5.1: Limited coverage of prediction using under-approximate models for two

Missed

Covered

threads (T1 and T2)
Observed

Predicted

Description of Unserializability

Execution

Execution

or Missed Reason

T1 T2
R
R
W
R
W
W
W
W
W
R
W
W
W
W
W
W
R
W
W
W
R
W
R
R
W
W
R
W
R
W

T1 T2
R
W
R
R
W
W
W
W
W
W
R
W
W
W
W

Two reading accesses read from
dierent writes

Forwarded writing access in T2
is overwritten

Forwarded writing access in T2
is overwritten

An intermediate value is read

Forwarded writing access in T1
is overwritten

Intra-thread read-after-write in
None

T1 prohibits interleaved writing
in T2
Inter-thread read-after-write

None

prohibits forwarded reading in
T2
Inter-thread read-after-write

None

prohibits forwarded reading in
T1
Intra-thread read-after-write in

None

T1 prohibits interleaved writing
in T2
Inter-thread read-after-write

None

prohibits forwarded reading in
T1
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5.2 Preliminaries
A multi-threaded program has a set of threads and a set of shared variables. An
observed execution

σ = s1 , ..., sn

executed statements.

of a multi-threaded program

P

is a sequence of

A trace is the projection of an execution to a sequence of

annotated shared variable accesses and synchronization events. Formally, a trace,

τ = e1 , ..., em

is a sequence of events where each event

ei (1 ≤ i ≤ m)

is a tuple

hseqi , tidi , actioni , bri i in which seqi is an increasing sequence number, tidi is a thread
handle,
and

bri

actioni

is either an atomic shared variable access or a synchronization event,

ei

is the number of branches between

within the same thread. Given a trace

(Eτ , ≺) can be dened, where Eτ
relation on

Eτ .

and its immediate preceding event

τ = e1 , ..., em ,

a partial order thread model

is the set of events occurring in

The causal relation

≺

τ

and

≺ is a causal

respects all constraints of synchronization

primitives and thread-local program orders.

Sequential consistency is assumed in

this chapter, as it is typically accepted by other related works. A feasible atomicity
violation prediction in sequential consistent memory models is also feasible in other
memory models.

Denition 11. A predicted atomicity violation in an interleaved trace τ 0 in (Eτ , ≺)
is a true violation if and only if it is contained in a feasible execution

The strength of the causal relation
traces in

(Eτ , ≺).

≺

aects the size of possible interleaved

When the same read-after-write relation in

any predicted atomicity violation trace

τ0

σ0.

is feasible.

τ

is enforced in

≺,

Such partial order thread

models are under-approximate and may miss feasible interleaved traces.
other hand, not enforcing the same read-after-write relation in

τ

within

On the

≺ results in

over-approximate thread models that contain all feasible interleaved traces as well
as infeasible ones.
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5.3 Post-prediction analysis
Methods using under-approximate models make precise (only feasible) atomicity
violation predictions but have limited coverage (missing other feasible atomicity
violations). This section introduces a post-prediction analysis method to improve
the coverage while ensuring precision. The under-approximate models can be relaxed
to become over-approximate models through removing the read-after-write relations
imposed by the observed execution. Our post-prediction analysis method works on
over-approximate models to remove false positives while achieving more coverage
than methods using under-approximate models. This analysis method is general and
is applicable to the prediction results from other methods using over-approximate
models.

The only information needed is an observed trace

accesses in

τ

τ

and three memory

that forms an atomicity violation pattern in a predicted alternative

trace [63][12].

5.3.1 Data constraints causing false predictions
Data constraints concern data dependencies that may make a predicted atomicity
violation trace infeasible, such as the branch conditions that are dependent on shared
variables and queue accesses that are dependent on shared indexing variables. Figure
5.2 gives an example of data constraints that need to be taken into consideration
when analyzing an atomicity violation prediction. Figure 5.2(a) shows a trace of an
observed execution, in which shared variable
a writing of
accesses to

index

index:

index

is read in line 7 and line 8 after

in line 3, and hence there are data dependencies in two pairs of
line 3 and line 7, line 3 and line 8. Figure 5.2(b) shows a trace of

a predicted atomicity violation, in which line 10 has a writing access to the shared
memory

item in Thread T2 between the reading (line 1R) access and writing access
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Figure 5.2:

An example of data constraint analysis for false positives (extracted

from Apache)

(line 1W) in Thread T1. However, both pairs of accesses to

index above are broken,

which makes the memory access in line 10 in the observed trace infeasible in the
predicted atomicity violation trace.
A perfect solution to the above problem requires a precise and complete partial
order thread model extracted from the observed trace. The precision ensures the
feasibility of any predicted atomicity violation in the partial order thread model, and
the completeness requires any feasible atomicity violation remain in the partial order
thread model. Enforcing all the read-after-write relations can ensure the precision of
the partial order thread models. Several methods [61][62] introduced the read-afterwrite relations as a simple solution to ensure the precision. However, the constraints
imposed by read-after-write relations are too strong, thus make the resulting partial
order thread model over restrictive and under-approximate.

Figure 5.3 shows an

example in which a real bug is missed if all the read-after-write relations are enforced,
because the reading access can be moved forward to read from a dierent writing
access.
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Figure 5.3: A real bug is missed due to a read-after-write relationship

5.3.2 Ad-hoc synchronization causing false predictions
Ad-hoc synchronization is often used to ensure an intended execution order of certain
memory accesses. Specically, instead of calling condition variable routines or using
other synchronization primitives, programmers often use ad-hoc loops to synchronize
a shared variable. A trace containing an ad-hoc synchronization includes a sequence
of reading accesses and a writing access, in which there is also a read-after-write
relationship as the data constraints discussed above. Figure 5.4 gives an example
of false positives related to an ad-hoc synchronization. (a) is an observed trace, in
which there is a sequence of reading accesses from line 2 to
writing access in line

n+1.

Line

n+2

reads after the writing in line

a predicted atomicity violation trace, in which

n+3W

is

b1k0 .

Line

n+2

n+2 where n ≥ 0,

n+3R

is a moved forward reading

is

r1

a1i0 ,

n+1.

line 1W is

and a

(b) shows

a2j 0 ,

and line

as the case (1) in Lemma 6,

which breaks the read-after-write relationship between line

n+1 and line n+2 in the

observed trace in (a). It is obvious the atomicity violation trace (b) is infeasible.
Thus the read-after-write relations in ad-hoc synchronization need to be enforced.
We treat ad-hoc synchronizations as a special case of data constraints discussed in
Section 5.3.1.
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Figure 5.4: A false positive related to an ad-hoc synchronization

5.3.3 Problem formulation
The method proposed in this section aims at avoiding false atomicity violation predictions while catching as many real bugs as possible. Our method works on overapproximate models to remove false positives while achieving more coverage than
methods using under-approximate models.
During post-prediction analysis, any predicted atomicity violation trace is an
alternative interleaving respecting the same causal relations imposed by the synchronization events as the original observed trace. Thus we can view a trace as a
sequence of atomic (reading or writing) accesses without synchronization events to
simplify the discussion. Let

τ = at11 , at22 , ..., atnn

be a sequence of atomic accesses to

share variables in an interleaved execution of two threads, in which a superscript
indicates the thread an event belongs to, thus

ti ∈ {1, 2}

for

1 ≤ i ≤ n;

and a

subscript indicates the occurrence position of an event in the interleaved trace.
Over-approximate methods in [63][11][56] were based on three-access atomicity
violation patterns
variable

x

a1i0 , a2j 0 , a1k0 ,

in thread 1 and

a2j 0

where

a1i0

and

a1k0

are atomic accesses to a shared

is an atomic access to

x

in thread 2. Table 5.1 gives

all possible scenarios that will result in atomicity violation patterns after reordering
the event in thread 2 to occur between the two events in thread 1.
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τ 0 = ..., a1i0 ,

A predicted atomicity violation trace in over-approximate methods is

..., a2j 0 , ..., a1k0 , ...

x. τ 0

utive accesses to a shared variable
in a given original observed trace

τ = ..., a2j , ..., a1i , ..., a1k , ...,

τ

including

occurred in

x. τ 0

happens after

τ = ..., a1i , ..., a1k , ..., a2j , ...

are not explicitly identied in

a1i0 , a2j 0 , a1k0 ,

are not important. The corresponding

x

is the result of reordering some accesses

such that (1)

a1i0 , a2j 0 , a1k0

also be reordered due to reordered

accesses to

τ. τ

τ0

and the exact positions of

i, j, k

or (2)

τ.

but may

i0 , j 0 , k 0

in

are the exact positions where three

may contain many other accesses to shared variables

is considered feasible if its prex up to

a1k0

which are three consec-

and thus may break the read-after-write relations in

Note that accesses other than

τ0

a1i0 , a2j 0 , a1k0

with atomicity violation pattern

does not aect the feasibility of

τ 0.

relations due to reordering aect the feasibility of

a1k0

is feasible since anything

Not all broken read-after-write

τ 0,

but some does.

5.3.4 Our method
The underlying idea of our method is checking whether any reordered event due
to reordered

a1i0 , a2j 0 , a1k0

Before reordering,

a2j

may break read-after-write relations in the original trace.

may happen after

is explained below assuming
5.5, 5.6 and 5.7.

w

and

r

a2j

a1k ,

or before

happens after

a1k ,

r2

is moved forward due to reordering of

relationship between

w1

and

In Figures 5.6 and 5.7,
same shared variable as

The idea of our method

a1i 99K a1k 99K a2j ,

in Figures

are used to describe a read-after-write relationship with

regard to a shared variable other than the one in
event

i.e.

a1i .

In Figure 5.5, a reading

a2j , thus breaking the read-after-write

r2 .

P rev(a2j )

a2j .

a1i0 , a2j 0 , a1k0 .

denotes the immediate preceding access to the

In Figure 5.6, due to reordered
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a1i0 , a2j 0 , a1k0 , P rev(a2j )

is

Figure 5.5: Read-after-write relationship is broken, assuming
1
a moved forward reading event before ak0 .

moved forward to happen before

a1i0 ,

thus

r2

is moved forward to happen before

causing the read-after-write relationship between
In Figure 5.7, due to reordered
before

r1 ,

a1i0 ,

thus

w2

a1i 99K a1k 99K a2j

w1

r2

and

and

w1 ,

is broken.

a1i0 , a2j 0 , a1k0 , P rev(a2j ) is moved forward to happen

is moved forward to happen before

causing the read-after-write relationship between

r1

instead of happening after

r1

and its original dening

writing access is broken.
Based on ideas above, Lemmas 5 and 6 identify all cases in which a reordered
event may aect the feasibility of

a

and before

τ (a, b)

b, τ [a, b)

including

τ 0.

be accesses in

b, a 99K b

Let

τ (a, b)

τ (a, b)

denote event

a

be accesses in

including

a,

and

τ

that occur after

τ (a, b]

occurs before event

be accesses in

b, P rev(ai )

the immediate preceding atomic access to the same shared variable as

i,

and

N ext(ai )

variable as

a

a

denote

in thread

denote the immediate succeeding atomic access to the same shared

in thread

i.

Lemma 5. Given a predicted atomicity violation trace τ 0 = ..., a1i , ..., a2j , ..., a1k , ...
0

0

0

with atomicity violation pattern a1i0 ,a2j 0 , a1k0 with regard to a shared variable x, and
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Figure 5.6: Read-after-write relationship is broken, assuming
1
a moved forward reading event before ai0 .

a1i 99K a1k 99K a2j

and

Figure 5.7: Read-after-write relationship is broken, assuming

a1i 99K a1k 99K a2j

and

a moved forward writing event.
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the original observed trace τ = ..., a1i , ..., a1k , ..., a2j , .... τ 0 may be infeasible due to
a violated data constraint (a broken read-after-write relationship) caused by one of
the following cases (1) a moved forward reading event in thread 2: r2 ∈τ (a1k , a2j ) and
r2 99K a1k0 ; (2) a moved forward reading event in thread 2: r2 ∈ τ (a1i , P rev(a2j )] and
r2 99K a1i0 ; or (3) a moved forward writing event in thread 2: w2 ∈τ (a1i , P rev(a2j )],
w2 99K a1i0 and there is some branch instruction between τ [a1i , a1k ).

Proof.
trace

Given the observed trace

τ 0 = ..., a1i0 , ..., a2j 0 , ..., a1k0 , ...,

moved before

k0

(we can assume

τ = ..., a1i , ..., a1k , ..., a2j ,...,

to obtain the violation

all access events in thread 2 between

k0 = j 0 + 1

k

and

j

are

since the violation trace is reported as

soon as a violation pattern occurs, and thus do not need to consider any thread 2
event after

i0

j ).

Some access events in thread 2 between

i and k

may be moved before

(we can assume the last thread 2 event need to move before

i0

is

P rev(a2j )

the violation pattern is reached as long as there is no other access to
between

i0

and

j 0 ).

and

w1

r2 ∈τ (a1k , a2j )

a1k0 99K w1

in

in

τ 0.

τ.

r2 99K a1k0 :

The read-after-write relationship

As a result, the new value of

(2) a moved forward reading event in thread 2:
if there is a writing event
such that

w1

w1 ∈τ (a1i , P rev(a2j )]

w1 99K r2
r2

and

in thread 1 accessing the same shared variable as

w1 99K r2

in

may make

τ

τ 0 [a1i0 , a2j 0 ]
and

r2

r2

if there is a writing

such that

w1 99K r2

may make

in

τ

w1 ∈τ (a1k , a2j )

is broken since

τ 0 [a2j 0 , a1k0 ]

r2 ∈ τ (a1i , P rev(a2j )]

and

infeasible;

r2 99K a1i0 :

in thread 1 accessing the same shared variable as

w1 99K r2

in

a1i0 99K w1

in

and

is broken since

w2 ∈τ (a1i , P rev(a2j )]

in thread 2

We analyze all such needed moves and their impact below: (1)

for a moved forward reading event:
event

x

since

τ.

r2

The read-after-write relationship

τ 0.

As a result, the new value of

infeasible; (3) a moved forward writing event in thread 2:

w2 99K a1i0 :

if there is a reading event

thread 1 accessing the same shared variable as

w2

such that

r1 ∈ τ [a1i , a1k )

r1 99K w2

in

τ 0.

in

This

new read-after-write relationship may break the old read-after-write relationship of
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r1 .

However, the new value of

within

τ (r1 , a1k0 )

τ [r1 , a1k0 ],

in

τ 0,

a1k0

does not aect the execution of any thread 2 event

but may aect the execution of some thread 1 event between

which can happen in two cases: (i) if the new value of

branch instruction between
at

r1

τ [a1i , a1k );

(ii) if the new value of

is used in some

directs the access

a1k0

to a dierent shared variable when the memory address of the access at

depends on the value of
variable

y

r1 ,

a new atomicity violation pattern

occurs, which makes

the new value of

r1

may make

τ0

on shared

τ 0 [a1i0 , a1k0 ] infeasible only if the new value of r1

is used

τ [a1i , a1k ).

Note a moved forward writing event in thread 2:
may break read-after-write relationships after

bility of

r01 , w2 , r1

a feasible atomicity violation trace. As a result,

in some branch instruction between

a1k0

r1

r1

w2 ∈τ [P rev(a2j ), a1k ) and w2 99K

a1k0 ,

but does not aect the feasi-

τ 0.

Figure 5.2 shows an example of case (1) in Lemma 5, where the predicted atomicity violation trace
observed trace

τ

τ0

in (b) is an infeasible alternative interleaving of the original

in (a). In (b) line 1R is

7 is the moved forward reading

r.

a1i0 ,

line 10 is

line 1W is

a1k0 ,

and line

Its read-after-write relationship with line 3 is

broken. As a result, the condition in line 7 is true and

τ0

a2j 0 ,

W ait is executed that makes

infeasible.

Lemma 6. Given a predicted atomicity violation trace τ 0 = ..., a1i , ..., a2j , ..., a1k , ...
0

0

0

with atomicity violation pattern a1i0 ,a2j 0 , a1k0 with regard to a shared variable x, and
the original observed trace τ = ..., a2j , ..., a1i , ..., a1k , .... τ 0 may be infeasible due to
a violated data constraint (a broken read-after-write relationship) caused by one of
the following cases (1) a moved forward reading event in thread 1: r1 ∈τ (a2j , a1i ] and
r1 99K a2j 0 ; (2) a moved forward reading event in thread 1: r1 ∈ τ (N ext(a2j ), a1k )] ,
r1 99K N ext(a2j 0 ), and there is some branch instruction between τ [a1i , a1k ).
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Figure 5.8: A false positive due to local dependency

Proof.

The proof of case (1) is similar to that in Lemma 5 and is omitted here. In

case (2), only a thread 1 reading event

r1 ∈ τ (N ext(a2j ), a1k )]

forward to reach the violation pattern such that
However, the new value of
in

τ (r1 , a1k0 )

τ [r1 , a1k0 ],

in

τ 0,

r1

N ext(a2j )

a1k0

in

τ 0.

but may aect the execution of some thread 1 event between

τ [a1i , a1k )

instruction between

r1

appears after

does not aect the execution of any thread 2 event

which can only happen if the new value of

new value of

needs to be moved

may make

r1

is used in some branch

as shown in the proof of Lemma 5. As a result, the

τ 0 [a1i0 , a1k0 ]

infeasible.

Note any moved forward writing event in thread 1 does not aect the feasibility
of

τ 0.
Figure 5.8 shows an example of case (1) in Lemma 6, where the predicted atom-

icity violation trace
observed trace

τ

τ0

in (b) is an infeasible alternative interleaving of the original

in (a).

In (b), line 3 is

3 is the moved forward reading

a1i0 ,

r1 ∈τ (a2j , a1i ]

line 2 is

a2j 0 ,

line 5 is

τ0

and line

, which broke the old read-after-write

relationship from line 2, and now reads a new value 0. As a result,
executed and thus

a1k0 ,

b1k0

will not be

is infeasible.

Figure 5.3 shows another example, which is not infeasible according to of case
(1) in Lemma 6.
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Lemmas 5 and 6 dene the necessary conditions that a violated data constraint (a
broken read-after-write relationship) can occur and thus makes a predicted atomicity
violation trace infeasible. Thus Lemmas 5 and 6 have ensured that any surviving
predicted atomicity violation trace is a feasible one. Our post-prediction analysis
method ensures precision while eliminating only a subset of predicted atomicity
violation traces breaking the read-after-write relations in the original observed trace.

5.3.5 Algorithm of post-prediction analysis
An observed trace contains a sequence of events, and each event is dened by a
thread identier

tid,

a memory access type (read or write)

var, and the number br

rw,

a shared variable

of branches between this event and its immediate preceding

event within the same thread. Other elds in an observed trace are omitted here
without aecting the post-prediction analysis. An atomicity violation prediction is
based on an atomicity violation pattern

a1i0 , a2j 0 , a1k0

involving two threads 1 and 2.

The algorithm shown in Algorithm 5.1 analyzes the feasibility of a predicted violation
according to Lemmas 5 and 6. Five true returns in the algorithm correspond to the
ve cases in Lemmas 5 and 6.

5.4 Replay
Post-prediction analysis on predicted violation traces, while making prediction precise and reducing possible missing real bugs, may still miss real bugs due to the
lacking of complete data dependencies.

Replaying validates a predicted violation

execution trace by orchestrating thread scheduling in a concrete execution for a
given input, can be used to alone to eliminate infeasible traces, or used after postprediction analysis to validate the feasibility of uncertain traces.
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Algorithm 5.1 Algorithm of post-prediction analysis
Input: τ : seq → (tidseq , rwseq , varseq , brseq ), and three seq:
that contain accesses relevant to a violation pattern

a1i0 ,

Output: Whether a predicted violation maybe infeasible.
1: if a2j > a1i then
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:
13:
14:
15:
16:
17:
18:
19:
20:
21:
22:
23:
24:
25:
26:
27:
28:
29:
30:
31:
32:
33:
34:

...a1i ..., ...a2j ..., ...a1k ...
a2j 0 , a1k0 in τ 0 .

prev ← max(seq) where tidseq = 2∧varseq = vara2j ∧seq < a2j
for r ∈ (a1i , prev] ∪ (a1k , a2j ) ∧ rwr = read ∧ tidr = 2 do
w = max(seq) where rwseq = write ∧ varseq = varr ∧ seq < r
if r ∈ (a1i , prev] ∧ w > a1i ∧ tidw = 1 then
return T rue

end if
if r ∈ (a1k , a2j ) ∧ w > a1k ∧ tidw = 1 then
return T rue
end if
end for
for r ∈ [a1i , a1k ) ∧ rwr = read ∧ tidr = 1 do

w = min(seq) where rwseq = write ∧ varseq = varr ∧ seq > r ∧ tidw = 2
if w ≤ prev ∧ ∃seq  (r < seq < a1k ) ∧ (tidseq = 1) ∧ brseq > 0 then
return T rue

end if
end for
end if
if a2j < a1i then
for r ∈ (a2j , a1i ] ∧ rwr = read ∧ tidr = 1 do

w = max(seq) where rwseq = write ∧ varseq = varr ∧ seq < r
if w ≥ a2j ∧ tidw = 2 then
return T rue

end if
end for

next ← min(seq) where tidseq = 2∧varseq = vara2j ∧seq > a2j
for r ∈ (a1i , a1k ) ∧ rwr = read ∧ tidr = 1 do
w = max(seq) where rwseq = write ∧ varseq = varr ∧ seq < r ∧ tidw = 2
if w > next ∧ ∃seq  (r < seq < a1k ) ∧ (tidseq = 1) ∧ brseq > 0 then
return T rue

end if
end for
end if
return F alse
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Figure 5.9: An example of replay related to data constraints

Figure 5.9 gives an example of data constraints, in which x is a shared variable.
In the gure, (a) is an observed execution in which there are no interleaved accesses
between line 1 and line 2; (b) and (c) are violation traces predicted based on overapproximate methods [63]. Both (b) and (c) break the read-after-write relationships
between line 2 and line 3, and are classied as uncertain (maybe infeasible) traces
by post-prediction analysis. During replay, (b) is recognized as a false positive since
line 5 cannot be executed because the branch condition is not satised, and (c) is
conrmed as violation trace.
Given atomicity violation trace
lation pattern

signal

after

a1i0 , a2j 0 , a1k0 ,

a1i0 ,

a

wait

τ 0 = ..., a1i0 , ..., a2j 0 , ..., a1k0 , ...

with atomicity vio-

we insert two signal-wait pairs in the following way: a

before

a2j 0 ,

a

signal

after

a2j 0

and a

wait

before

a1k0 .

The

memory access order will be enforced to let atomicity violation manifest; however,
as shown in Figure 5.10(a), there can be a deadlock even for a feasible prediction.
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Figure 5.10: Replaying need considering mutex

Thread

T2

rstly acquires the lock then wait for a signal, while thread

T1

cannot

acquire the lock thus not be able to issue a signal, as a result, the two threads
cannot make any progress and run into a deadlock. Therefore, mutex locks need to
be taken into consideration when inserting instructions for enforcing the predicted
interleaving.

a1i0 and a2j 0

Let

L11

and

respectively,

L22

L = L11 ∩ L22 ,

the rst lock acquiring in
releasing in
we insert a

L.

If

signal

L 6= ∅,
after

be two sets of locks acquired before
and let

L, LastU nlock(L)

F irstLock(L)

a1i0

and between

be the instruction for

be the instruction for the last lock

instead of inserting a signal-wait pair as described earlier,

LastU nlock(L) and a wait before F irstLock(L).

and insert another signal-wait pair similarly between

a2j 0

and

a1k0 .

We dene

An example is

shown in Figure 5.10(b).
A potential problem with above inserted signal-wait pair is that the modied
program may run into deadlocks, livelocks and missing memory accesses, as shown in
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Figure 5.11. Figure 5.11(a) shows a deadlock, a signal-wait pair is inserted between
line 3 and 2, and there exists an ad-hoc synchronization implemented by a shared
variable

done. T 2

is waiting on

T1

to set the ag

done,

while

T1

is waiting on

T2

as required by the predicted interleaving, it results a circular wait. Figure 5.11(b)
shows a missing memory access, the predicted violation trace expects the memory
access in line 2 interleaves between memory accesses in line 3 and line 5. However,
line 5 together with inserted instructions are not executed at all as the condition
in line 4 is not satised, so replaying misses a memory access and is not able to
observe the predicted interleaving.
can not make progress while

T2

Figure 5.11(c) shows a livelock in which

T1

continues as normal, because line 5 together with

inserted instructions are not executed.
A simple solution is to use timeout mechanism to detect deadlocks and livelocks
caused by inserted signal-wait instructions, and to check signal-wait pairs in observed
replaying to detect missing memory accesses. If a deadlock, or a livelock or some
missing memory accesses are detected, the predicted interleaving is not feasible and
is marked as a false positive; otherwise, replaying continues as usually without a
large number of context switches.

5.5 Experiments and Evaluation
We have implemented the proposed algorithm in a prototype tool based on the tool
in [63] and conducted several experiments. The tool is automatic such that it only
requires running a use case of the target executable as the manual step. During our
experiments for the replaying method, predicted traces of known atomicity violations in [63] and Table 5.3 can be validated through replaying successfully, while all
other predicted violation traces cannot be replayed due to data constraints. Our ex-
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Figure 5.11: False positives pruned out by replaying
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Table 5.2: Experimental Results using Apache and FFmpeg
Program-Size

Events_in_Trace

OA

PPA

PPA-time

Apache

1.5 MB

140532

155

1

12.1 sec

FFmpeg

41 MB

550352

29

0

11.6 sec

periments for post-prediction analysis PPA used the benchmarks in [12], Apache web
server and FFmpeg audio/video codec library. The sequel in this section discusses
the experiments for PPA.
The results of experiments using Apache and FFmpeg are shown in Table 5.2,
and the results of experiments using the benchmarks in [12] are shown in Table 5.3.
In Table 5.2, Apache has a known atomicity violation bug but FFmpeg does not.
The rst column

Program-Size

Events_in_Trace

gives the size of the executable, the second column

lists the number of events in the trace; the third column

OA

contains the number of prediction by the over-approximate method McPatom; the
fourth column
last column

PPA is the number of prediction by post-prediction analysis PPA; the

PPA-time

is the time in seconds to perform post-prediction analysis.

In Table 5.3, Programs

atom001

and

atom002

have atomicity violations that

are extracted from a real bug [10]. Their modied versions without atomicity violations are

atom001a

and

atom002a.

Other programs are Linux/Pthreads/C im-

plementation of the parameterized bank example [67], in which program
has atomicity violations; program

bank-sav-8

bank-av-8

adds a condition variable as a partial

x without avoiding all atomicity violations for any shared variable; and program

bank-nav-8

adds a transaction lock to remove all atomicity violations.

three columns provide the statistics of programs, in which

The rst

svars-causing-av

is the

number of shared variables that cause atomicity violations. The next three columns
provide the statistics of our method, which uses the results of an over-approximate
method McPatom [63].

OA-svars

is the number of shared variables that cause atom-
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0

3
9
9
9

atom002a

bank-av-8

bank-sav-8

bank-nav-8

0

8

8

1

3

atom002

0

1

8

8

8

1

1

1

1

svars

causing-av

3

3

atom001

OA-

svars-

atom001a

threads

Program

name

0

8

8

0

0

0

1

svars

PPA-

0.83

0.79

0.73

0.05

0.04

0.06

0.06

PPA-time

Our method

32

32

32

34

34

2

2

pavs

hb-

0

16

32

0

33

0

1

avs

sym-

CTP[12]

140.6

4.6

2.5

17.6

20.4

0.03

0.03

sym-time

Table 5.3: Experimental results compared to CTP and UA methods
Other

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

UA-avs

icity violations predicted by over-approximate methods,

PPA-svars

is the number

of shared variables predicted by post-prediction analysis PPA that cause atomicity
violations and

PPA-time

is the running time in seconds.

are statistics provided in [12], in which
violation traces and
of

hb-pavs

sym-avs

hb-pavs

The last three columns

is the number of predicted atomicity

is the number of feasible atomicity violation traces out

obtained from using symbolic method CTP. Note that a single shared

variable may generate many possible atomicity violations traces, which can often
be xed in a single x. We count shared variables in
one feasible predicted violation trace.

PPA-svars

The last column

UA-avs

that have at least
is the number of

predicted atomicity violation traces by under-approximate methods that enforce all
read-after-write relations.

Lightweight and fast
The running times in Table 5.3 show our method's scalability is promising compared
to that of the symbolic method CTP. When the size of programs grows, e.g.

nav-8

bank-

contains more code than others, the formulas built in CTP also grow bigger

and require more time to be solved. Our method stops as soon as a broken read-afterwrite relation dened in Lemmas 5 or 6 is detected, incurs insignicant time increase
when the size of a program grows, and thus can handle much larger programs.
Our method is also evaluated using the complete Apache web server and FFmpeg
audio/video codec library, as shown in Table 5.2, in which the running times show
the scalability of our method is promising for large scale software.
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Precise predictions and better coverage
The results show that our method reports no false positives while reporting more real
bugs than under-approximate methods. Thus our method is precise and improves
coverage. One shared variable in

atom002

is missed due to read-after-write relations

of accesses to other shared variables. Our method cannot decide whether it is feasible
because the value of a shared variable or a local variable depending on the value
of a shared variable aects the feasibility.

[12] collects and encodes all program

information in CTP and thus can detect it.

5.6 Related Works
5.6.1 Post-prediction analysis
The post-prediction analysis method in this chapter achieves precision and improves
coverage by reducing the number of missing real bugs compared to other precise
methods. Under-approximate models such as [61][58][62] admit only interleavings
with the same read-after-write relations as in the observed executions to achieve precision; however, the constraints imposed by read-after-write relations are too strong,
thus make the model over restrictive and may miss real bugs.

Over-approximate

models such as [63][56][64][65][66] admit not only all feasible interleavings but also
infeasible interleavings due to data constraints and ad-hoc synchronization, thus
make prediction imprecise due to false positives. [60] allows broken read-after-write
relations but prohibits the thread with such a read event to continue, hence can be
considered as an under-approximate model.
CTP [12] is an analysis tool applicable to the predicted violation traces generated by over-approximate methods, thus is the most relevant work to ours. CTP
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achieves precision and complete coverage by using the values of shared variables
and local variables in the predicted atomicity violation trace, which requires heavy
instrumentation and the static analysis of source code of expressions. Our method
explores ways to ensure precision and to improve coverage while avoiding heavy
instrumentation and the static analysis of source code.

5.6.2 Replay
Penelope [56] instruments the scheduler to follow a predicted schedule, from which
it gets a set of threads and the number of steps that each thread should take before
next context switch.

Similar to us, the way it counts steps is also based on the

events that were monitored during an observed execution.

Only after execution

reaches the point that the violation pattern is executed, the scheduler releases all
threads to execute as they normally do. Thus, before it reaches the point, it has to
pay the same overhead as an observed execution, and in addition the overhead of
instrumenting scheduler.
Maple [68] memoizes tested interleavings and tries to expose untested interleavings for a given test input to increase interleaving coverage. The predicted untested
interleavings are exposed by controlling the thread schedule during execution for the
test input. In Maple, the active scheduler takes the test input and forces all threads
to run on a single processor, and therefore records the order of the thread schedule.
CHESS [53] is a systematic and deterministic testing tool for concurrent programs. It takes complete control over scheduling of threads. However, its scheduler
is non-preemptive , therefore cannot model the behavior of a real scheduler that
may preempt a thread at any point in its execution.

129

Existing works mentioned above need heavy context switches. However, even following exactly the same schedule of a predicted atomicity violation trace using heavy
context switches cannot guarantee perfect replaying. Perfect replaying is impossible without capturing all sources of nondeterminism, as demonstrated in [69][70][71].
Our method reduces context switches to the minimal level by allowing nondeterminism while trying to ensure the determinism of events related to predicted atomicity
violations.

In case of a large number of predicted atomicity violation traces, our

method performs post-prediction analysis rst to eectively and signicantly reduce
the number of replays needed.

5.7 Summary
Predictive methods for atomicity violations need to consider the tradeos between
precision and coverage. This chapter presented a post-prediction analysis method
and a replaying method to ensure the precision and improve the coverage of predicted
atomicity violation traces generated from over-approximate methods.
prediction analysis method covers all ten scenarios in Table 5.1.

The post-

The replaying

method reduces context switches to the minimal level to improve scalability. Figure
5.1 compares our methods with other predictive methods on coverage and precision,
in which our post-prediction analysis method PPA improves coverage while ensuring
precision, our replaying method further improves coverage and ensures precision as
well. Both methods does not rely on the instrumentation of local variables and the
analysis of source code. Therefore, our methods are scalable and applicable to large
programs.
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CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

6.1 Summary
This dissertation presents methods and tools for modeling and analyzing concurrent
software systems at design and code levels, to improve reliability of concurrent
software.

At design level, we build a formal specication of Mondex using Petri

nets, and provide a way of using model checking to verify the formal specication of
Mondex, including the abstract model and concrete model. We also develop methods
to mine traces to build Petri nets automatically to aid designing scientic workows.
At code level, we develop methods and tools to predict atomicity violation bugs using
binary instrumentation and model checking techniques.
Our method for mining traces to build Petri nets is based on provenance of scientic workows, and mine both data and control dependency. The mining result can
either suggest part of others' workows for consideration, or make familiar part of
workow easily accessible, thus provide recommendation support for scientic workows composition, which oers a new approach to build workows in the context
of scientic workows.

Given the fact that provenance captured in any scientic

workow based systems or system level monitoring systems contains information
about tasks and their temporal order, the proposed algorithm can give both control
and data dependency for recommendation during scientic workows composition.
Our tool McPatom, using model checking to predict atomicity violation concurrency bugs, is powerful and can explore a vast interleaving space of a multi-threaded
program based on a small set of instrumented test runs.
to large real-world systems.

McPatom is applicable

Predictive methods for atomicity violations need to

consider the tradeos between precision and coverage.
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Our post-prediction anal-

ysis method and our replaying method are presented to ensure the precision and
improve the coverage of predicted atomicity violation traces generated from overapproximate methods. The post-prediction analysis method covers all ten possible
scenarios. The replaying method reduces context switches to the minimal level to
improve scalability. Comparing to other predictive methods on coverage and precision, our post-prediction analysis method PPA improves coverage while ensuring
precision, our replaying method further improves coverage and ensures precision as
well. Both methods does not rely on the instrumentation of local variables and the
analysis of source code. Therefore, our methods are scalable and applicable to large
programs. The experiment result shows the scalability of our methods is promising
compared to related works.

6.2 Future Work
In our tool McPatom, although the extracted thread model contains all equivalent
interleavings that have the same happen-before relationships as the instrumented
interleaved trace, there can be other interleaved traces containing dierent happenbefore relationships involving other pairs of threads due to branching structures in
a concurrent program. Thus in order to predict all potential atomicity violations,
enough instrumented interleaved traces need to be captured during test runs of the
program. In a word, existing works on atomicity violation prediction check one path
at a time, however, it is desired for predictive analysis to reason on entire families
of paths. Additional methods can be developed in the future work, to improve the
branch coverage toward the completeness of predicting atomicity violations.
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